1750s. For the next two decades it was the scene of repeated violent outbursts, one of which coincided with the Bashkir revolt of 1755 and brought severe government reprisals. Not surprisingly, then, it was to the Avziano-Petrovsk works that Pugachev sent an emissary, Khlopusha by name, in search of weapons and volunteers. Himself a former metal worker, Khlopusha had turned to brigandage, had been four times beaten with the knout, had twice escaped from Siberia, and was languishing in an Orenburg prison, with torn nostrils and branded forehead, when Governor Reinsdorp offered him freedom if he would go to Berda and denounce Pugachev as an impostor. Eager to escape his chains, Khlopusha accepted, but on arriving in Pugachev's camp promptly defected to the rebels. Pugachev sent him on a new mission, to drum up support among the Urals workers, and this time he faithfully carried out his assignment. With a Cossack escort he arrived at Avziano-Petrovsk in October 1773 and, in the name of Peter III, granted the workers "personal liberty and freedom from all taxes." [38] The announcement was greeted with jubilation, and hundreds of workers joined him, bringing cannon, horses, and supplies. From Avziano-Petrovsk they rode through the surrounding area promising "to shut down all the factories." At each enterprise the pattern was the same. Swearing an oath to the emperor, the ascribed peasants (but only a fraction of the skilled workmen) attacked the factory office, plundered the strongbox, burned official documents, and pillaged the homes of the administrators. News of the tsar's return was received with wild excitement. Nor did the workers trouble themselves about Pugachev's real identity so long as he told them what they wanted to hear. As one of them put it: "They are all tsars to us, whoever they are!" [39] Pugachev, indeed, was more than a tsar. He was a Christ-like messiah heralding the dawn of a new age. With a millennial fervor the workers rejoiced that "our resplendent sun, hidden beneath the earth, now rises in the east, shedding rays of mercy over the whole universe and warming us lowly orphans and slaves." [40]

Khlopusha's mission was a great success. In November 1773 he returned to Berda laden with cannon, rifles, powder, and money, and with 1000 recruits for the rebel army. For the duration of the winter Pugachev pressed his siege of Yaitsk, Ufa, and Orenburg, laid siege to half a dozen lesser administrative centers,

and sought additional forces to guarantee the success of these operations. When volunteers did not suffice, he sent detachments into the countryside to gather recruits by force. By the end of the year his army numbered between 10,000 and 15,000, of whom there were some 1500 Cossacks, 5000 Bashkirs, and 1000 workers, the rest including serfs, Tatars, and Kalmyks, with a sprinkling of other tribesmen, religious dissenters, convicts, priests, and an occasional merchant or nobleman. It was a motley body, loosely organized, poorly armed, short of horses and supplies, fluctuating in numbers and quality, and except at the outset when the government was unprepared, not particularly effective. The Cossacks, it is true, formed a seasoned and comparatively well-armed nucleus that could deploy more than eighty cannon obtained from captured factories and forts. But the infantry was inexperienced and badly equipped. Rifles and pistols were in short supply, so that the ragtag troops had to rely on knives, cudgels, and sharpened stakes, and occasionally fought with nothing but rocks and bare fists. Discipline, moreover, was a constant problem, which Pugachev answered with severe measures. One rebel was hanged merely for boasting that he knew where "the emperor" really came from. To increase their efficiency Pugachev formed his men into regiments according, so far as possible, to national or social origins, placing each under the command of a trusted associate. The Yaik Cossacks, for example, comprised a regiment under Andrei Ovchinnikov, Pugachev's ablest commander. Similarly the factory peasants were organized under Khlopusha, the Bashkirs under Kinzia Arslanov, and so on. Each regiment was in turn divided into companies which elected their own officers in the Cossack manner. But the regimental commanders, or "colonels," were appointed by Pugachev himself, each having his own banner of red or gold silk embroidered with Old Believer crosses and with images of Christ or of St. Nicholas the Miracle Worker. Near every major target—Orenburg, Yaitsk, Ufa, or the newly beleaguered towns of Ekaterinburg, Cheliabinsk, and Kungur—local headquarters were established by one of the colonels, who enjoyed considerable autonomy in his own bailiwick. To impose a measure of control, however, a "War College," modeled after the one in St. Petersburg, was set up at Berda in November 1773, and strove with limited success to coordinate operations. Beyond this, it functioned as a logistical center, maintaining supply

lines with the Urals factories, from which it ordered cannon, mortars, and ammunition.

Pugachev was by all accounts an able commander-in-chief. In the most difficult engagements, his confederates later testified, he was to be seen at the head of his troops issuing orders and urging them forward. Foreign observers compared him—both as a rebel and as a military leader—to Oliver Cromwell. From his Cossack upbringing and long army experience he was acquainted with tactics and organization, but his particular strength was artillery. At the height of the rebellion he had 100 cannon (captured from government forts or forged in the Urals foundries), which gave him a military might of which Bolotnikov, Razin, and Bulavin could scarcely have dreamed. His gun emplacements at Berda were of such outstanding quality that, according to Governor Reinsdorp, "Vauban himself could not have constructed better."[41] To give the impression of even greater strength, he ordered decoy cannon to be fashioned from wood and painted to look like the real thing. In the field, moreover, his guns were mounted on sledges for easy mobility, and by a series of lightning marches, such as only Cossacks were able to perform, government outposts were overwhelmed and, except for the more strongly defended administrative centers, the vast territory from the Urals to the Volga fell under effective rebel control.

At the same time, Pugachev inaugurated a rebel government over which he ruled as Peter III. Choosing for his palace the finest house in Berda, he assumed the role that people would expect from a true emperor and played it with evident relish. He surrounded himself with a personal guard of twenty-five Cossacks who called him "your excellency" and "dear father" (*batiushka*) as they would the real tsar. On special occasions he wore a white embroidered shirt, a robe of red velvet, and a black lambskin hat with a crimson lining. As the Duke of Holstein (a title of Peter III) he displayed an old Holstein banner that one of his men had captured during the Seven Years' War. And on a wall of his headquarters hung a portrait of the Tsarevich Paul, of whom he spoke with feigned paternal affection.

Berda, in short, became a grotesque parody of the Russian capital, though Pugachev called it his Moscow instead of St. Petersburg, perhaps because the old capital, the traditional center of serfdom, remained the foremost symbol of aristocratic oppression. But he had his Petersburg too, in the town of Kargala, and a Kiev as well, in Sakmarsk. Moreover, aping the imperial court, he dubbed his closest confederates with the names of Catherine's favorites, so that Ovchinnikov became Count Panin, Zarubin Count Chernyshev, Shigaev Count Vorontsov, and Chumakov Count Orlov. In Pugachev's mock court the rebels amused themselves with heavy drinking, peasant dances, and bawdy Cossack songs. Pugachev himself seemed a curious mixture of Petersburg emperor and people's tsar, a Cossack warlord in velvet robes at the head of a popular government. With his colonels and counts and other Western paraphernalia, he distinguished himself sharply from earlier rebel leaders, who had rejected European customs. Yet his up-to-date image was superficial. Unlike his predecessors, he was playing the role of an emperor, and for this his imperial trappings were necessary props. But beneath the thin exterior was a traditional popular rebel whose goal was a popular tsardom with extensive local autonomy. "If God sees fit that I should conquer the throne," Pugachev declared, "then I shall allow everyone to pursue the old faith and to wear Russian clothing. But none shall be allowed to shave his beard, and I shall command everyone to cut his hair in the Cossack style." To make this dream a reality, he would "go to Moscow and then to Petersburg and conquer the whole state" and eliminate the boyars.[42] With such a program it was not hard to convince the people that he was their true ruler. They wanted desperately to believe it, and he in turn, because of their response, tried to live up to his role, becoming the servant of his own myth. To some extent, perhaps, he may actually have come to believe it. At any rate, it was with a measure of genuine conviction that he spoke of liberation and proclaimed a new era of popular justice.

4. Bibikov

It was several weeks before news of the uprising reached St. Petersburg, and the government's response was desultory. Pugachev's claim to be Peter III, and his declared intention to join

with the tsarevich and depose Catherine, may have irritated the empress, but she was not unduly alarmed. For Pugachev was merely one of a long line of false Peter IIIs, and his outbreak seemed merely another local Cossack disturbance on the fringes of the empire, which the Orenburg governor could handle without difficulty. In any case, with her troops engaged against the Turks, Catherine was unable to spare more than a small force to suppress the revolt, and it was not until November that these reinforcements made their appearance. Nor did the delay pass unnoticed. In fact it added to the rumors that the true tsar had returned. For if Pugachev was an impostor, asked the workers of one Urals factory, why were no troops sent to put him down?[43]

Some troops were actually on the way, though an insufficient number to contain the rebellion. To prevent speculation by foreign observers, the government maintained a strict curtain of silence, so that Sir Robert Gunning, the British ambassador, could not even learn the correct name of the officer sent from Moscow to deal with the insurgents. It was not "Bauer,"[44] but Vasili Kar, who was ordered in mid-October to raise the siege of Orenburg. Of Scottish lineage, though born and educated in Russia, Kar was a veteran of the Seven Years' War who had risen to major general; yet despite his rank and experience he was a mediocre officer, and he had only 500 men and 6 guns at his disposal. Fortunately, a larger force was dispatched about the same time from western Siberia under General Ivan Dekolong (de Colongues), an officer of French extraction and a veteran of numerous campaigns. Two additional detachments were summoned from the Volga, one from Simbirsk under Colonel Chernyshev (no relation to the minister of war) and the other from Kazan led by Brigadier Korf.

With four government parties converging on him, Pugachev would appear to have been in grave danger. But this was not at all the case. Kar and his colleagues had vast distances to cover; communications between them were virtually nonexistent; none knew the plans or precise whereabouts of the others; and so they were unable to mount a concerted attack. Moreover, they had little reliable information about the activities of the rebels, while the rebels received a good deal about theirs from sympathetic tribesmen and peasants, and were of course better acquainted

with the terrain. Thus Pugachev had the advantage of surprise; and he was able to deal with his opponents singly rather than as one formidable army.

Orenburg was heartened by the news of Kar's approach. But his progress was slowed by heavy snowfall and severe frost. At last he reached the area, only to discover that the rebel army was much larger and better armed than he had expected; and "owing to faintheartedness and poor behavior," as a contemporary put it, he "allowed himself to be beaten."[45] On November 8 a large rebel force under two of Pugachev's ablest commanders, Andrei Ovchinnikov and Ivan Zarubin, encircled Kar at the village of Yuzeevka. With the Cossacks shouting at them not to oppose "the emperor," Kar's troops were thrown into confusion, and nearly a hundred defected when the rebels promised them "the lands, seas, and forests, the cross and beard, and full freedom."[46] Worse still, according to a French officer exiled in Kazan, Kar had gone into battle without reconnoitering his opposition. As Kar himself testified: "The rogues swept in like the wind from the steppe, and their artillery did much damage." Nor, he said, did they "shoot the way one might expect of peasants."[47]

Kar beat a swift retreat to Kazan, where news of his defeat threw the gentry into a panic. Many decided to flee, and though the governor, Yakov von Brandt, tried to calm their fears, his efforts failed when it became known that he had sent his own family to safety and emptied his house of its furniture. From Kazan, Kar proceeded to Moscow "with as much haste as he had left it," and Catherine, furious at his "weakness of spirit," cashiered him and instructed the Moscow governor to tell him "not to dare show himself before my eyes."[48] Meanwhile Pugachev was not idle. Following up his victory over Kar, he led the defeat of Chernyshev near Orenburg and had him executed with 32 other officers and one of their wives. But Korf managed to slip past him and into the besieged city with his badly needed contingent of 2500 men and 22 guns.

By now Catherine realized the gravity of the situation. At the end of November she offered a 1000-ruble reward for Pugachev's capture, a figure which would increase sharply as the revolt expanded. But a more important step was her appointment of General Alexander Bibikov to take charge of the pacification.

Bibikov was an excellent choice. Born of a military family, he had twice been cited for bravery in the Seven Years' War and had later distinguished himself against the Poles. Moreover, he had proved his ability to tame domestic unrest by crushing factory riots in the Urals. A statesman as well as an officer, he had served in both the Senate and the War College and as Speaker of Catherine's short-lived Legislative Commission. "His known probity," noted the British ambassador, "his unaffected patriotism and his great military knowledge gave him the justest title to favour and confidence of his mistress." [49] Bibikov, in short, was a model imperial servant. He and Pugachev represented two distinct worlds, as Catherine understood when she advised him to use the "superiority which courage, education, and culture always afford against an ignorant mob driven only by the stormy fanaticism of religious and political superstition and obscurantism." [50] To Catherine the Bibikovs stood for enlightenment, civilization, progress, the Pugachevs for superstition, barbarism, reaction. Pugachev, in her eyes, was not merely a brigand and a traitor; he was a "monster of the human race," an offender against the public order and against those divine and secular laws without which no empire could stand.

Such, at any rate, were the terms in which she denounced the pretender in a manifesto of December 1773, on the eve of Bibikov's departure for Kazan. That Pugachev should take the name of her late husband was a source of particular irritation, owing perhaps to an uneasy conscience over his death. "It would be superfluous here," she wrote in the manifesto, "to prove the absurdity of such an imposture, which cannot even put on a shadowy probability in the eyes of sensible persons." But the empress was plainly troubled—so much so that she conjured up the memory of the Time of Troubles, when, "because of an impostor, towns and villages were ravaged by fire and sword, when the blood of Russians was spilled by Russians, and when the unity of the state was in the end destroyed by the hands of Russians themselves." It was an unwise analogy, as her advisors pointed out, since it could "only recall unpleasant events and encourage the insurgents." [51] The parallels between Peter III and Tsarevich Dmitri—their sudden and mysterious death followed by their miraculous

reappearance under the banner of insurrection—were better left unstated.

In December 1773 Bibikov hurried to Kazan with a regiment of cavalry and two of infantry and wide powers to deal with the rebels. Meanwhile the contagion continued to spread. Toward the end of the month, following a three-month siege, Yaitsk fell to the insurgents, except for the stockade, to which a force of Cossack loyalists and the garrison commander had retired. Repeated attempts to breach the walls were rebuffed at considerable cost, and as time wore on the loyalists were reduced to eating their horses, and "cold and hunger," one of them recalled, "brought us to a state of despair which increased with each day." [52] At one point there was a momentary respite when the attackers paused to celebrate Pugachev's marriage to a local Cossack girl who had caught his fancy. It was a lavish wedding, as befitted a royal couple, the ceremony performed to the accompaniment of cannon and church bells. Yet its effect was to damage the pretender's image and to sow doubts among his followers. How can an emperor marry an ordinary Cossack? it was asked. And what about the empress Catherine (to say nothing of his real wife and children on the Don)?

For the moment, however, such doubts were put aside, and by January 1774 the revolt, according to a foreign witness, had 30,000 adherents and was growing "more serious every day." [53] At Ufa and Orenburg the situation became desperate, as provisions dwindled and morale sagged. Further east a force of Bashkirs and ascribed workers placed Cheliabinsk under siege and a mutiny broke out within the town in which an angry mob dragged the governor through the streets by his hair before his troops could restore order. The rebel commander, Ivan Griaznov, an Old Believer with a talent for millenarian propaganda, bombarded the inhabitants with leaflets which cast Pugachev in the combined role of Christ rescuing the poor and Moses leading the Israelites to the Promised Land:

> Our Lord Jesus Christ wishes through his holy providence to free Russia from the yoke of servile labor. We all know who has brought Russia to this state of hunger and exhaustion. The gentry own the peasants, and though in God's law it is written that the

> peasants too are God's children, yet they treat them not merely as servants but as lower than the very dogs with which they hunt rabbits. The company men have got hold of most of the factories and have so burdened the peasants with work that there is nothing at all like it, not even in exile at hard labor. How many are the tears shed to the Lord by the workers and their wives and small children! But soon, like the Israelites, you shall be delivered out of bondage.[54]

To this was added another popular myth: that Peter Fyodorovich, having liberated the gentry, had drawn up a manifesto freeing the serfs as well, but that the landlords had suppressed it and deposed the tsar, who, wandering like Christ in the wilderness for eleven years, had now returned to carry out his intentions. Pugachev, said Griaznov, was no impostor. He was the true Russian tsar, come at last to emancipate the poor.

Throughout the winter factory peasants and Bashkirs continued to provide the Cossacks with their most zealous supporters. While Khlopusha and Kinzia remained indispensable leaders, new men of equal ability now made their appearance. A notable example was Ivan Beloborodov, about the same age as Pugachev and born near Kungur in the heart of the Urals mining region. When the Seven Years' War broke out, Beloborodov was conscripted to work in a munitions factory near St. Petersburg. After seven years of hard labor, with no prospect of release, he feigned illness and was allowed to return to Kungur, where he married and set up shop as a trader in beeswax and honey. But in January 1774, when a Pugachev courier read a manifesto in the market square, Beloborodov was won over. Organizing a force of workers from a Demidov foundry near Ekaterinburg, he moved from factory to factory emptying the strongboxes, burning official records, and seizing a large quantity of supplies and ammunition. At each enterprise Beloborodov told the workmen that the "great sovereign" was coming to free them from compulsory labor and to cancel their dues and taxes. Calling his adherents Cossacks, and himself their *ataman*, he divided them into hundreds and distributed loot in equal portions. He put his own factory experience to good use by supervising the production of weapons and teaching his men how to use them. One by one the large enterprises of the Ekaterinburg area were taken, and the city itself was gradu-

ally encircled, for which the government commander, Colonel Vasili Bibikov, must be held partly responsible. For unlike his namesake, the colonel was a listless officer whose preparations for the assault were grossly inadequate—indeed at one point he even considered fleeing to save his own neck. Yet despite his incompetence Ekaterinburg managed to hold out until reinforcements arrived.

Among the Bashkirs the outstanding new leader was Salavat Yulaev, the son of a prominent elder, Yulai Aznalin, who had fought against the Prussians in the Seven Years' War and had been decorated for bravery against the Polish Confederation. Yulai was thus a Bashkir loyalist, a common phenomenon within the tribal hierarchy. In fact he and his son had been sent by Governor Reinsdorp to fight the insurrectionists but were taken prisoner by Ovchinnikov and promptly defected. Salavat, though only twenty-one, already had three wives and two sons; and with his dark hair and eyes and tall green cap, as a Bashkir song describes him, he cut a handsome figure. What was more, he was a popular folk poet who read and wrote Tatar and knew the Koran by heart. Highly esteemed by his fellow tribesmen, he had little trouble recruiting an army "to serve the sovereign," [55] and, occupying Krasnoufimsk without a struggle, he marched on Kungur, whose *voevoda* fled in panic, leaving the defense of the city to the local merchants and gentry and a small contingent of troops.

With Ufa and Orenburg under siege, Kungur and Ekaterinburg threatened, and Yaitsk all but taken, General Bibikov had his work cut out for him. Arriving at Kazan toward the end of December, he reprimanded Governor von Brandt for his lack of initiative and set about organizing the local gentry into an effective fighting force. In addition, he posted a 10,000-ruble reward for Pugachev's capture, while Pugachev, for his own part, ordered a gibbet constructed with a sign in gold letters "For Bibikov." [56] Bibikov was quick to size up his adversary. He saw that Pugachev's rising, like those of the past, was a broad social struggle of the have-nots against the haves, a clash of two cultures, of the two social and spiritual worlds into which the nation was divided. Pugachev "may be even more dangerous to the nobility and the rich than he is to the empress," he told the Kazan aristocracy. "This is a revolt of the poor against the rich, of the slaves against

their masters." The pretender, Bibikov recognized, could have made little headway but for the widespread unrest, the ground swell of discontent, which underlay his movement. "Pugachev himself is not important. What is important is the general indignation." [57] A similar observation was made about the same time by the future poet Gavriil Derzhavin, then a young lieutenant under Bibikov's command:

> One must determine whether, in the event we kill him, there will not appear a new and even more dastardly swine calling himself the tsar. Is he the only one who calls himself by that name, or are there many who do so? Do the people look on him as the real deceased sovereign, or do they know that he is in fact just Pugachev, though their coarse instincts for insurrection and robbery do not allow them to reject him? [58]

Nor was Catherine herself blind to what the *Pugachevshchina* represented: a rising of peasant Russia against its ruling aristocracy. In a letter to Bibikov she pointedly numbered herself among the landowners of Kazan and pledged that the security and well-being of the gentry "are inseparable from our own and our empire's 'security and well-being." [59] She increased the reward on Pugachev's head, and ordered his house on the Don burned, the ashes scattered to the winds, and his family sent to Kazan, where Bibikov tried to use them to discredit the pretender by telling the people his true identity.[60]

All this was to no avail. But Bibikov had other weapons that were far more effective. Between January and April a number of capable officers with well-armed troops came under his command, and one by one they relieved the Urals towns. Toward the end of January the siege of Kungur was lifted by Major Dmitri Gagrin with two rifle companies from Dekolong's Siberian army. For several days Salavat had tried to capture the city, but he had not reckoned on Major Alexander Popov, whom Bibikov ranked among his best garrison commanders. Popov ordered drums beaten to drown out rebel demands for surrender. Then, launching a sudden attack, he caught Salavat off guard and forced him to withdraw to Krasnoufimsk, where Gagrin overtook him and dealt a decisive blow. Gagrin next headed his troops toward Ekaterinburg to deal with Beloborodov. In a series of savage engagements

factory after factory was cleared of insurgents, Beloborodov fled to Berda, and Ekaterinburg was out of danger. Gagrin then moved against Griaznov, who had occupied Cheliabinsk on Dekolong's premature withdrawal, and again the rebels were defeated, although what became of Griaznov, a remarkable figure about whom little is known, remains a mystery.

Meanwhile, Ufa had also found its liberator in Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Mikhelson, second only to Bibikov himself as the outstanding hero of the government forces during the rebellion. A brilliant young officer from the Baltic nobility, Mikhelson enjoyed a well-earned reputation for courage in battle. He had served under Bibikov in the Seven Years' War, had been wounded at both Zorndorf and Kunersdorf, and had fought with equal distinction against Turkey and Poland, receiving the Order of St. George for bravery in combat. Little wonder that Bibikov, his former commander, should choose him now to lift the siege of Ufa. Since the previous November Ufa had been under continuous attack by Zarubin's predominantly Bashkir army. Cold and hunger gripped the inhabitants, whose stores were seriously depleted. Yet Zarubin (like Bolotnikov at Moscow) was unable to impose a total blockade, so that a trickle of supplies continued to flow into the city. The defenders, fearing a massacre by the tribesmen, were determined to hold out at all costs, and repeated rebel attacks were thrown back with heavy losses. Quarreling broke out between the Bashkirs and the Russians in Zarubin's camp, and energies were further squandered in raids on factories and estates, so that by mid-March, when Mikhelson's crack carbine regiment arrived in the area, the insurgents were tired and discouraged. Still, they outnumbered their opponents by more than ten to one; and the tribesmen were fighting on native territory which they were loath to surrender to the invaders. On March 24, under cover of darkness, Mikhelson mounted a swift attack, with his troops on skis to increase their mobility. Once again training and equipment told heavily against the rebels, who offered fierce resistance before being dispersed. Many of the Bashkirs refused to be taken alive, and hundreds were left dead in the snow, while Mikhelson, if government figures are to be credited, had only twenty-three killed and thirty-two wounded.

While Mikhelson was liberating Ufa, a large army under Gen-

erals Golitsyn, Mansurov, and Freiman converged on Orenburg to lift the six-month siege, of which Pugachev himself was in charge. Here again the rebels, though superior in numbers, were vastly outdistanced in arms and discipline. Of their 9000 adherents fewer than a third were Cossacks, the rest being a disparate assortment of Bashkirs, Tatars, Kalmyks, serfs, factory peasants, and vagrants, with an arsenal ranging from axes, stones, and clubs to the latest cannon and carbines. Apprised of the government's strength, Pugachev moved his motley forces to Fort Tatishchev, the scene of his first major victory a half year before. It was here that he made his stand. Using an old technique, the defenders piled snow around the fort, over which they poured water to form a solid barrier of ice. The device, however, was outdated. On March 22 the generals brought up their heavy artillery and, in a three-hour bombardment, reduced the defenses to rubble. When the barrage ended, infantry rushed in from three sides and overwhelmed all resistance. More than 2000 rebels were killed—their corpses littered the fort and the surrounding roads and woods—and all their cannon were taken. By comparison the government's losses (150 dead and 500 wounded) were trivial. The site of Pugachev's initial triumph became the site of his first shattering defeat, after which, as always, support quickly evaporated.

But the pretender was still at large. Retreating to Berda, he tried desperately to regroup his forces. But his camp was buzzing with intrigue, and, fearing betrayal, he collected what followers he could and raced through Kargala (his "St. Petersburg"), then on to Sakmarsk (his "Kiev"), where disaster overtook him. On the night of April 1 General Golitsyn quickly encircled the town, and of the rebel leaders only Pugachev and Ovchinnikov managed to escape, leaving most of their confederates—Khlopusha, Shigaev, Pochitalin, Gorshkov, Padurov, Miasnikov—in Golitsyn's hands. (Zarubin had already been captured at Ufa.) All told, nearly 3000 were taken prisoner. Pugachev, fleeing northward into Bashkiria with a remnant of his once-powerful army, became the object of a determined manhunt that kept him in hiding for several weeks.

Ovchinnikov, with a small party of Cossacks, rode west to Yaitsk, the sole remaining rebel stronghold. The Cossack capital, where the revolt had originated, was the last town to be relieved.

On April 15, when General Mansurov arrived, Ovchinnikov was already there, but his tired followers, outnumbered and outgunned, were quickly dispersed. The next morning Mansurov entered the town in triumph, amid cries of joy from the exhausted and half-starved garrison, whose commander, Colonel Simonov, received an estate with 600 serfs from a grateful empress.

In the end, none of the major administrative centers of the Urals was taken, with the sole exception of Cheliabinsk, and then only briefly. Orenburg, Ufa, Kungur, Ekaterinburg, and the Yaitsk citadel all held out until government relief arrived. Similarly, during the coming summer, rebel forces entering the towns of the Volga would be quickly put to flight. Why did Pugachev fail where his predecessors had succeeded? Why did his revolt fail to take root in the towns, where Bolotnikov and Razin (though not Bulavin) had found so much of their support? Lack of organization and discipline—internal discord, national antagonisms between Russians and Bashkirs, the dispersal of forces over a wide territory, the waste of energy in raiding and plunder—undoubtedly played a part. But more important than the weaknesses of the rebels were the strengths of their opponents. Both economically and politically the towns were more developed and less given to popular disturbances than in the past century. The improved quality of troops and equipment was another critical factor. Thus the government, for all its inefficiency, proved more than a match for the destructive whirlwind from the southeastern frontier.

In Moscow and Petersburg it was widely believed that the rebellion was over. The pretender's army was smashed, his support vanishing, his confederates captured, his movement in disarray. In March 1774 Bibikov could report that the rebels had "been defeated, and hour by hour we are approaching peace and tranquillity."[61] But Bibikov did not live to see his victory consummated. Toward the end of March, while his troops were dispersing the remaining rebel concentrations, he suddenly fell ill at his field headquarters, between Kazan and Orenburg. Doctors sent from Moscow arrived too late, and on April 9, at the brink of success, he died. Bibikov "came to get the sovereign, but seeing him face to face took fright, and from a button of his coat drank a powerful poison and died." Such was the interpretation of a

Urals workman, to whom no boyar malefactor could be a match for the true emperor. Bibikov, at any rate, died before his work was finished; and his death, the British ambassador feared, could "give new courage to the insurgents." [62] The rebel movement, though damaged, was not completely broken, while the government's drive was interrupted, allowing Pugachev a much-needed respite during which, deep in the hills of Bashkiria, he could begin to raise a new army. The first act of the rebellion was over. But a second and more formidable act was soon to begin.

5. Kazan

On May 1, 1774, Bibikov's second in command, General Fyodor Shcherbatov, was appointed to succeed him. Shcherbatov, though an experienced officer and a veteran of Zorndorf and Bender, was a disappointment compared with his predecessor. He had little of Bibikov's imagination or ability to command devotion. His gravest defect was a quarrelsome nature which embroiled him in continual disputes with his subordinates, who on the whole were a capable lot with whom Bibikov had maintained smooth relations. During the spring and summer, owing partly to Shcherbatov's limitations, the rebellion again flared out of control, and more than six months were to elapse before it was finally extinguished.

Pugachev, meanwhile, his army dispersed and his "War College" in prison, had taken refuge in the hills of Bashkiria where, after lying low for most of April, he began to collect a new following. After their defeat at Yaitsk, Ovchinnikov and Beloborodov came to join him, and by the middle of May they had gathered nearly 8000 recruits. The rebels, in the words of a Swiss journal, had been "reborn from their own ashes." [63] Husbanding his strength, Pugachev shook off pursuing detachments and avoided pitched battles. He fought only when forced to fight. He was constantly on the move, sweeping through villages, factories, and stockades, carrying out hit-and-run raids and gathering men and equipment. Shcherbatov and his officers seldom knew his exact whereabouts. Mobility was his chief strength,

enabling him to appear quite suddenly where least expected, attack his target by surprise, and withdraw as quickly as he had come. His adherents, largely Bashkirs from the surrounding area, could make their way through mountains and valleys impenetrable to regular government formations, with their cumbersome weapons and supply trains.

Yet, for all Pugachev's evasiveness, his pursuers were never far behind. On May 21 Dekolong and Gagrin surprised the rebels in their camp, groggy with drink like Razin's Cossacks at Resht, and cut them to pieces. Pugachev managed to escape, only to run headlong into Mikhelson, who inflicted heavy casualties and seized the bulk of his munitions. But the impostor again got away and soon drew a fresh batch of recruits. Word of his reappearance had meanwhile swept through the Urals and western Siberia. "'Under Pugachev," declared a convict in Omsk prison, "salt is sold for twenty copecks and wine for a ruble a bucket. Maybe this will happen in Omsk if we live to see the day when Pugachev comes here to the fortress." [64] Whereupon he was hanged on Dekolong's orders for spreading malicious rumors.

Even more than before, Pugachev relied on the Bashkirs and the factory peasants as his chief source of volunteers. The government made every effort to stem the flow from these groups into the rebel ranks. Shcherbatov, for instance, sent emissaries to the Bashkir elders with a promise of subsidies if they shunned the revolt; and more than a few, fearing class war within their tribe, now broke with Pugachev just as the service gentry had broken with Bolotnikov and the Cossack oligarchy with Razin. When persuasion failed, the tribesmen were threatened with violence. "I will execute you, hang you by the legs and ribs, burn your homes, your property, your grain and hay, and destroy your cattle," declared one of Shcherbatov's officers. "Do you hear me? If you do, then take care, for I am not in the habit of lying or joking." Such language, however, merely strengthened their will to resist. Nor was the Holy Synod's denunciation of Pugachev as "the disciple of Antichrist Mahomet" calculated to win their allegiance.[65]

During the spring of 1774 the Bashkirs attacked Russian villages and factories with unprecedented fury. On May 26, according to a government report, the huge Avziano-Petrovsk metal

works was "reduced to ashes" by raiding tribesmen. At another large enterprise, the foundries, the office, the church, the dwellings—"everything was burned down," noted an eyewitness.[66] The extent of the damage was enormous. Of some 120 Urals factories, at least 90 were forced to stop production at some point during the rebellion, 74 were attacked and plundered, and 56 were occupied by rebel detachments. All told, more than half were destroyed or seriously damaged. For several months production was at a near standstill, and it took the rest of the decade for output to reach former levels. The raids, moreover, unleashed a mass exodus of ascribed peasants, most of whom returned to their villages, so that by the end of the rising only half the workers were still on the job.[67]

At the same time resistance to the raiders was often quite fierce, particularly in the larger factories equipped with garrisons, watchtowers, and artillery. Nor was it only the soldiers and administrators who fought against the rebels. Skilled artisans and year-round workmen, for whom the factory was the sole means of existence, often aligned themselves with the defenders. As the number of raids increased, more and more workers complained that the Bashkirs were threatening them with ruin. And as national antagonisms sharpened, a growing number of ascribed peasants began to side with their fellow Russians against the "heathens." But in most cases they either fled to their villages or joined in the plunder and destruction, and at one factory they warned a supervisor against resisting "while your belly is still in one piece." [68]

The previous fall and winter there had been comparatively little destruction, for Pugachev's lieutenants had been able to restrain their tribal adherents. But the situation had changed. Zarubin had been captured and Pugachev severely trounced. For the Bashkirs it was now or never. They were determined once and for all to remove the monuments of colonialism from their midst: "'Go home! Your time is done! Our fathers who gave you land are dead, and we will suffer you no longer." [69] By now, moreover, Pugachev's own position had changed. He no longer wished to restrain them. On the contrary, he himself ordered the factories destroyed and personally led raiding parties against them. There were several reasons for this shift. In the first place he

wanted to placate the Bashkirs, his mainstay of support, whom he in any case could no longer control. A second motive, as Roger Portal has suggested, was sheer military necessity: the factories, having been reoccupied by the government, were no longer sources of munitions, but were enemy strongpoints which had to be destroyed by lightning raids.[70] Finally, Pugachev no longer needed them, for he had decided to abandon the Urals and strike at the heart of the empire.

In June 1774 the rebellion took an ominous turn. Where before it had been confined to the peripheries beyond the Volga and Kama, now came the alarming news that Pugachev was marching westward toward the central core of Muscovy. "Instead of being crushed, he is become more formidable than ever," reported Sir Robert Gunning to the foreign secretary. "This rebel spreads terror and devastation wherever he turns; and according to the last accounts seems inclined to correct his first error, and march towards Casan and Moscow, that is to say, into the heart of the empire; where it is much feared that he will find a great number of discontented persons." [71] This was indeed his intention. He would march on Kazan, he told his confederates, "and after taking it go to Moscow and then to Petersburg and conquer the whole state." Before him rode his couriers with their leaflets and manifestoes, and ascribed peasants, returning to their native districts, spread the news of his coming. The peasants of the Volga and Kama, astir with promises of freedom, suspension of taxes, and relief from compulsory military service, awaited their savior with eager anticipation. Some, unable to wait, sent deputies to the insurgents with a plea to come at once and deliver them from their masters. Disturbed by these reports, Catherine ordered her governors not to exact unusual work from their peasants or provoke them in any way, but rather to remove the causes of unrest and restore "peace and quiet" to their provinces.[72] But her celebrated favorite, Grigori Potemkin, sounded a less conciliatory note. Incensed by Pugachev's promise to abolish taxation and recruitment, he firmly defended the existing system: "Who will guard the borders of our state when there are no soldiers? And there will be no soldiers without recruiting. How will the soldiers be maintained without the soul tax? Where would the Turks have got to by now if Russia had no troops?" In the

same vein he denounced Pugachev's egalitarian pretensions and his war on landlords and bureaucrats: "Try to imagine who would administer the towns and villages if we had no officials. Who would judge in court, restrain wickedness and injustice, and ward off the oppressor if there were no legal authorities? And who would command the armed forces if there were no distinctions of rank? How patently absurd are the malicious delusions of Emelka Pugachev!" [73]

Yet precisely such "delusions" had inspired a mass movement which pointed directly at Moscow. On June 21 the rebels occupied Osa, a small town on the Kama River southwest of Kungur. Behind them forts, factories, and estates lay in ruins, the countryside was ravaged, and Russian settlements were in embers from Bashkir assaults. Osa put up a determined struggle, pouring a hail of missiles and boiling oil upon the attackers, but when Pugachev prepared to set the walls alight, the townsmen decided to surrender. The pretender entered in triumph. In a scene repeated elsewhere, an old soldier who claimed he had once seen Peter III came forward and confirmed that Pugachev was the emperor. But though the town had capitulated, Pugachev ordered it burned anyway, a sign of things to come.

It was early July when the rebels, some 7000 strong, forded the Kama and advanced on Kazan. Kazan was the chief administrative and commercial center of the middle Volga region and the gateway to central Muscovy. Yet it was ill-prepared for an attack. The inhabitants, wrote General Pavel Potemkin (a cousin of Catherine's favorite), who was in charge of defending the city, were in "great desperation and terror," and many had fled to points west.[74] Pugachev's sudden move against Osa had taken Shcherbatov unawares. Most of his troops were still hunting the rebels in the remote Bashkiria highlands, and frantic calls were issued for reinforcements, but they arrived too late. Meanwhile, to bolster the garrison at Kazan, which contained only 700 regulars, ordinary civilians, including students of the local gymnasium, were mobilized and armed. But they were of little use against Pugachev's savage followers, and on July 12, when the attack began, they hastily retired to the citadel.

The outer city was quickly overrun and given up to pillage and destruction. The streets swarmed with insurgents who moved

from house to house laden with stolen goods. The prison was thrown open, reuniting Pugachev with his wife and three children, though at first he refused to recognize them, insisting they were the family of an ordinary Don Cossack of his acquaintance. Also liberated was the Old Believer Abbot Filaret, who had set the impostor on his rebellious path and had afterward been arrested. Buildings, once ransacked, were burned. The wooden structures went up like tinder. Fires blazed out of control in every part of the city. On the main street, according to a local merchant, "not a post was left standing." [75] Of 2873 houses in the city, only 810 survived the holocaust. Twenty-five churches and three monasteries were stripped of their valuables (largely by Bashkirs and other tribesmen) and gutted. Townsmen without beards or in "German" clothing were set upon and beaten or killed. In a single day of violence Kazan lost 162 dead, 129 wounded, and 468 missing without a trace. Survivors recalled the scene with horror for many years to come.

Pugachev meanwhile trained his guns on the citadel and launched a continuous bombardment, which took a heavy toll. As casualties mounted, more and more defenders wanted to surrender, and Potemkin hanged two of his men as an example to the rest. "The greatest misfortune," he wrote on the day of the attack, "is that the people are not trustworthy." [76] The whole province, he said, was ready to revolt. But help was on the way. Mikhelson, after a forced march from the Urals, arrived the next day, July 13, and though his men were tired and woefully outnumbered, he immediately formed them in columns and charged the rebel positions. "The scoundrels greeted me with a great shout and with such a hail of fire as I, who have fought against many different opponents, seldom have seen and from such barbarians did not expect," he wrote.[77] By nightfall, however, the rebels were compelled to withdraw, leaving 800 dead and an equal number of prisoners.

Three times Pugachev regrouped his forces and returned to the fight, but each assault was driven back with heavy losses of men and equipment. The final encounter lasted several hours, and the pretender, sacrificing 3000 followers and all his artillery, barely managed to escape, fleeing across the Volga with Mikhelson in pursuit. Kazan was liberated. The rebels were again dispersed; and

though Pugachev had slipped away, Beloborodov, having found refuge in a nearby forest, rashly returned to the city, where he was recognized and arrested.

With the sacking of Kazan panic seized the residents of Moscow. The upper classes feared that Pugachev, having reduced Kazan to a heap of blazing ruins, would now make directly for the heartland. St. Petersburg too was alarmed, so much so that the court even considered retreating to Riga. According to a contemporary, "a panic seized half the country; and the same spirit of sedition which animated Pugatcheff had infected the rest." [78] For the moment, however, it was Moscow, where lower-class discontent had been dramatically revealed during an outbreak of cholera in 1771, that experienced the greatest terror. The geographical heart of the empire and the bastion of serfdom, the old capital remained the chief target of mass revolts long after Petersburg had replaced it as the official seat of government. A sprawling congeries of gentry residences, markets, shops, and hovels of the poor, it was densely populated with household serfs and peasant laborers whose sympathies were overwhelmingly with the pretender. Each week saw hundreds arrested, some merely for drinking to Pugachev's health, so that the prisons were crammed with "seditious people." [79] Records of the secret police reveal that throughout the surrounding countryside the peasants were ready to rise for the "third emperor." "Praise God, we shall not have to live for our masters much longer," a villager declared, "for now Peter Fyodorovich is coming to us and he will ascribe all the peasants as his own and hang the nobles. He is the true tsar." [80]

Given such expectations, it is small wonder that Moscow was gripped by panic. It was a moment of immense danger and terrifying suspense. If Pugachev could arouse the central provinces, the classical region of serfdom, the whole existing order might collapse. Would he try to make for Moscow? Would he touch off a general rising of the serfs against their masters? Such questions, arising at the climax of the Turkish War, provoked great interest all over Europe, where the revolt was widely reported in the press. In fact word of the *Pugachevshchina* spread as far afield as the New World, where it was carried in the *Virginia Gazette* in the summer of 1774. The interest displayed

abroad encouraged a tendency among Russian officials to see the revolt as a plot hatched by hostile foreign powers: some thought Pugachev an agent of the Polish Confederation, others of the Turks or the French or the Swedes. But no evidence has come to light of any foreign complicity, though the Swedish king wryly remarked that Catherine had cause to be grateful that he did not conclude an alliance with the pretender. The Secret Commission in Kazan, charged with examining the causes of the revolt, made a thorough investigation and concluded that Pugachev had received "neither outside guidance nor assistance" but had been backed only by the "ignorance of the people of this land, their simplicity and gullibility." [81]

One question was on everyone's lips: Would Pugachev, having crossed the Volga, now head his movement toward Moscow? Nervous officials in the former capital could already scent the smoke of burning manor houses. Yet had they recalled the history of past rebellions they might have been less pessimistic. For Razin and Bulavin had faced a similar decision and both had opted to remain in the peripheries lest, like Antaeus, they should lose their strength if cut off from their native soil. The government might have taken comfort from this fact. Indeed, for Pugachev there was even greater reason to avoid the central districts. For the second time in less than six months his army had been defeated, whereas Moscow was strongly defended and expecting reinforcements at any moment. Furthermore, Mikhelson had swept around his flank to cut off any attempted drive into the heartland. Thus Pugachev chose to follow the example of his predecessors. For a few days he clung to the west bank of the Volga, heading upstream in the direction of Moscow; but at the town of Kurmysh he turned abruptly southward in hopes of igniting the Volga valley as Razin had done before him. Should he suffer defeat, however, he would hold to his course and, as he had planned the previous autumn, lead his followers to safety in the south.

6. The Volga

During the summer of 1774 an immense jacquerie broke out along the western bank of the Volga, marking the climax of the rebellion. Though defeated at Kazan, the movement had not been broken. In fact, as the pretender moved down the Volga, he touched off new outbreaks on a greater scale than ever. "Pugachev was fleeing," noted Pushkin, "but his flight seemed an invasion." [82] For as he fled he scattered the sparks of sedition in all directions, and for two months insurrection engulfed the Volga valley from Nizhni to Tsaritsyn, from Simbirsk to Tambov, the same peasant and tribal districts which had rallied to Razin a century before. "The damned owl frightened Kazan on July 12," wrote the archimandrite of Our Savior of Kazan Cathedral, "and though his wings are damaged, it is evident that his bats are flying all over the outskirts, barring all the roads, so that during this month there have been neither couriers nor post from or to Kazan." [83]

The months of July and August were the high-water mark of the rebellion. A vast stretch of territory—Kazan, Nizhni Novgorod. Arzamas, Alatyr, Sviiazhsk, Simbirsk, Penza, Shatsk, Saransk, Tambov, Voronezh—became the scene of savage violence encompassing more than three million people, or nearly an eighth of the population of the empire. It was the third time in nine months that revolt had flared up over a broad area. But now its social composition was somewhat altered. As the scene shifted from the Urals to the Volga, so too did the base of rebel support, with a sharp increase in numbers but a decline in military efficiency and in the degree of control imposed from above. In place of Cossack and Bashkir horsemen and Urals gunsmiths it was peasants and agricultural tribesmen who filled the rebel battalions. The largest group were serfs from private estates, who rose on a scale and with a fury unmatched in rebellions of the past.

Why were they so ripe for revolt? The answer is not far to seek. The reign of Catherine marked the golden age of the Russian nobility and the zenith of Russian serfdom. With their emancipation from compulsory service, many landowners returned to their estates, where they exercised virtually absolute power over their peasants. By Pugachev's time the government had all but ceased to interfere in the nobleman's treatment of his

serfs. He could reduce their land allotment, raise their dues and quitrents, increase their labor obligation, and compel them to work in his factories. And his control over their private lives was more complete than ever. He might seize their property, interfere with their marriages, convert them into domestic servants, or sell them apart from the land and even from their wives and children. The trade in peasants reached a peak during Catherine's reign, breaking up families and immeasurably increasing frustration and despair. The empress herself, by giving away hundreds of thousands of crown peasants—many of them in provinces to be affected by Pugachev's revolt—transformed them overnight into private serfs at their master's beck and call. The lord, moreover, exercised manorial justice. He could have a peasant beaten or put in chains. He could send him to prison or into the army or to Siberia—and at government expense. Finally, he might emancipate—that is, cast off—old or infirm serfs who were no longer useful as servants or field hands. By the 1770s, in short, the serf had become a mere chattel at his owner's disposal. As a leading authority on the Russian peasant has noted, "the landlord ruled a little monarchy within the great one." [84]

Against the arbitrary powers of his owner, the serf had no legal redress, which goes a long way to account for the frequency of flight and rebellion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was forever at the mercy of his master's moods and appetites. Nor did the state intervene to protect him. During Catherine's long reign only twenty cases are on record where landlords were punished for mistreating their serfs. In August 1767, as we have seen, Catherine went so far as to forbid complaints against masters on penalty of the knout and of banishment to hard labor in Siberia. Some lords, no doubt, dealt humanely with their peasants, looking after them in times of hardship and famine, but unbridled power is not conducive to humanitarian behavior; rather, it tends to bring out the worst in men, corrupting even the most enlightened, so that brutality and exploitation remained constant features of the master–serf relationship.

During Catherine's reign, moreover, the economic position of most serfs deteriorated. In some provinces the average quitrent (*obrok*) more than tripled, while on estates where servile labor (*barshchina*) was performed the accepted standard of two or three

days a week was increasingly ignored, and some landowners required their serfs to work continuously until the harvest had been gathered and prepared for market. As the demand for grain increased both at home and abroad, driving prices steadily higher, more and more proprietors switched from *obrok* to *barshchina* in order to raise their output. For the peasant this represented another serious setback, entailing as it did closer supervision by his owner and less freedom in managing his own affairs. Like the conversion of state peasants to serfs, it meant a sudden reverse in terms of autonomy and status as well as economic position, and it is significant that some of the worst rioting of Pugachev's revolt occurred in districts where *barshchina* was emerging as the dominant form of obligation.[85]

At bottom, then, the grievances of the peasantry were as much a matter of status as of economic oppression. Their aspirations were essentially the same as those of other disaffected groups who flocked to Pugachev's banner. Like the Cossacks and schismatics, the Bashkirs and ascribed workers, they yearned to recover the traditional "liberties" of which the gentry and the state had deprived them. As they saw it, the emancipation of the nobility by Peter III had overturned the only legitimate foundation on which serfdom had rested, as part of the overall system in which service was required of all segments of the population. With Peter's manifesto of 1762 the peasants felt that their masters, being freed from their obligation to the state, had no further claim to their services; and, as has been seen, rumors became rife of a second manifesto liberating the serfs from their proprietors.

What the 1762 manifesto inspired, however, was not so much the desire for absolute freedom as for the relative freedom of the crown peasantry, a status which some of Pugachev's followers had enjoyed until Catherine transferred them to her favorites. For the private serf the dream of emancipation assumed the concrete shape of conversion to a state peasant, by which he would become the property of the sovereign rather than of the noble. Nor was Pugachev blind to this aspiration. As he moved down the Volga he issued a flood of proclamations releasing the serfs from their masters and converting them into crown peasants. More than that, he promised them free use of the land and unrestricted personal liberty, as well as free distribution of salt

and exemption from taxes and recruitment. Catherine dismissed this propaganda as "essentially that of simple Cossacks."[86] But this was precisely what made it so effective. For it told the people what they wanted to hear, and in terms they could understand. The manifestoes, wrote Pushkin in *The Captain's Daughter*, a novel based on the Pugachev revolt, were written "in crude but forceful language, and must have produced a strong impression upon the minds of the simple people." Catherine, steeped in Western culture, could not appreciate that other world of folk eloquence embodied in Pugachev's appeals.

The most striking of these manifestoes, issued in July 1774, deserves to be quoted at length:

> By this decree, with sovereign and paternal mercy, we grant to all hitherto in serfdom and subjection to the landowners the right to be faithful subjects of our crown, and we award them the villages, the old cross and prayers, heads and beards, liberty and freedom, always to be Cossacks, without recruiting levies, soul tax or other money taxes, with possession of the land, the woods, the hay meadows, the fishing grounds, the salt lakes, without payment or rent, and we free all those peasants and other folk hitherto oppressed by the malefactor gentry and the bribe-takers and judges in the towns from the dues and burdens placed upon them. We wish you the salvation of your souls and a peaceful life here on earth, for we too have tasted and suffered from the malefactor gentry much wandering and hardship. . . . Those who hitherto were gentry in their lands and estates, those opponents of our rule and disturbers of the empire and ruiners of the peasants—seize them, punish them, hang them, treat them in the same way as they, having no Christian feeling, oppressed you, the peasants. With the extermination of these enemies, the malefactor gentry, everyone will be able to enjoy a quiet and peaceful life, which will continue evermore.[87]

This was by far the most extraordinary document to emerge from the rebellion. It expressed in vivid language the essence of Pugachev's program. By canceling taxes and military service, converting private serfs into state peasants, restoring the old faith, and declaring war on bureaucratic despotism, it fulfilled all the popular expectations associated with the late emperor. With strong millenarian overtones it cast the pretender in the role of a messiah who had come to eliminate the oppressors and to restore the

ancient bond between the people and their anointed father. Biblical myth was mingled with a pagan demonology in which the nobility formed an alien breed of parasites sucking the blood of the people. Pugachev's was a Manichaean vision which pitted the forces of good, embodied in the common folk, against the forces of evil, embodied in the landlords and officials. And though the tsarist framework was retained, Pugachev himself emerged as the sovereign ruling in the people's interests.

The manifesto had an enormous impact. Up and down the Volga, wrote Derzhavin to Shcherbatov, the peasants "eagerly awaited Peter Fyodorovich on whom they have set all their hopes." According to Frederick the Great, who followed the revolt with keen interest, "the rural population went in crowds to meet Pugachev and greeted him as their savior." The excitement began in advance of his arrival. It was enough to hear that the "third emperor" was on the way to set off a violent reaction. "In their blind ignorance," wrote General Golitsyn, "the common people everywhere greet this infernal monster with exclamations of joy." It was said that he was Stenka Razin come to life again to punish the wicked and liberate the peasants. In Penza province villagers and priests met him with icons and hailed him as their true sovereign: "We never believed he was dead, and here he is alive, and henceforth all will be state, not landlord's, peasants." [88]

Nor was it mere ignorance or superstition that led the peasants to believe in the pretender. They were always inclined to believe what favored their interests and to reject what did not. For them Pugachev was the true tsar whoever he was, as they sometimes put it. And his strength owed much to their conviction that they were rising not only for themselves but for their sovereign, whose manifestoes set the royal stamp of approval on their actions. Captured serfs often claimed innocence of wrongdoing on grounds that "Peter Fyodorovich" had removed them from the jurisdiction of their masters. When they attacked their owners and put them to flight, orders from the tsar had given them legal sanction.

In this connection, the role of the parish priest was of critical importance. As in the risings of Razin and Bulavin, the lower clergy—priests, sextons, monks—participated in large numbers. They greeted the pretender with icons and crosses, conducted services on his behalf, and prayed for his safety and success. All

this, of course, strengthened the peasants' conviction that they were fighting for the legitimate sovereign. Indeed, one village priest assured his congregation that "there is no empress, but there is an emperor, Peter III." [89] Nor was he alone in doing so. Whether from sympathy or fear of reprisals, the vast majority of parish priests sided with the pretender, identifying their cause with that of the peasants to whom they ministered. Such was the attitude of two priests in a village near Penza who drank a toast "to the health and success of the former emperor, Peter III." For us common folk, they said, Pugachev is "not a rogue but our friend and protector." [90] Some clergy, however, remained steadfast in their loyalty to the empress. A village priest near Kazan, for example, urged his parishioners "to defend the faith and the fatherland against the insurgents." But the peasants refused to listen. Pugachev, they insisted, was the "real emperor" who had come to free them from their masters and who, so they heard, would pay five rubles to whoever served him—whereupon they drove the priest from the village.[91] Recalcitrant clergymen were sometimes the victims of rebel violence. During the course of the rising more than 200 priests and their wives were killed, and 63 churches and 14 monasteries were sacked, mostly, however, by marauding Cossacks and vengeful tribesmen rather than local peasants.

The non-Russian peoples of the Volga responded to Pugachev with the same enthusiasm with which they had greeted Stenka Razin a century before. By Catherine's time most of the tribesmen had been baptized and classed as state peasants, and economically they were better off than their Russian counterparts. Yet they continued to harbor strong resentment against the Muscovite intruders, so that when Pugachev arrived with promises of land and liberty and freedom of worship they hailed him as their "own father." [92] A group of Chuvash villagers near Kazan cast their lot with the rebels because their Russian landlord had taken their livestock and compelled them to till his fields as virtual slaves. "Nor are we the only ones to suffer such insults," they said, "but there are many villages that weep because of him." Similarly, Votiak tribesmen testified that they joined because forced baptisms, heavy tribute, and the confiscation of their lands had reduced them to "unbearable exhaustion and privation." [93]

Another group that played an important part in the rebellion were the so-called *odnodvortsy*, or homesteaders, who were especially numerous in the black-soil districts of Tambov and Voronezh, where they constituted a majority of the taxpaying population. As we have seen, several of the pretenders who preceded Pugachev came from the homesteader class, and whenever a would-be messiah appeared in their midst they were eager to respond. The reasons are not hard to discover. Descended of impoverished gentry, *streltsy*, and other petty service men, the homesteaders were relics of the age of Muscovite colonization beyond the Oka River, where they had been settled during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for defense against the Kalmyks and Tatars. In return for service, they had received, like the gentry, a plot of land and other privileges, including exemption from taxes and the right to own serfs. Additional homesteaders were settled on the northern Don and Donets by Peter the Great after Bulavin's insurrection in that region. By the end of his reign, however, Peter, hungry for recruits and taxpayers, reclassified them as state peasants, with all the obligations of that group, and ever since, they had been trying unsuccessfully to regain their former status.[94]

The *odnodvortsy*, then, occupied an anomalous position on the social ladder. An in-between class with features of both the peasantry and the lesser nobility, they aspired to the position of the latter while sinking to the level of the former. Like the gentry, they held their own land in return for service, and some continued to own a few serfs, though they were now prohibited by law from purchasing more. But, like the peasantry, they were liable to the poll tax and *obrok* and to regular military service. Caught in a squeeze between the peasantry and the gentry, distrusted by the one and despised by the other, the homesteaders suffered a kind of social schizophrenia from which they desperately tried to escape. Many became Old Believers, in quest of a happier past. Some worked as bailiffs for the nobility, others as merchants in the provincial towns, but the majority carried on their traditional occupations of cattle breeding, sheep herding, and agriculture, while being victimized by their gentry neighbors, who coveted their land and livestock, and who prevented them from entering their ranks. Again and again the homesteaders

petitioned Catherine to recognize them as petty noblemen, but their appeals went unanswered. Small wonder, given their blurred identity and uncertain position, that they were susceptible to the blandishments of a pretender. Like the Cossacks and tribesmen, they were victims of an order in which they held no secure place, and they dreamed of a bygone age when they were distinguishable from the common herd of peasants.

Thus Pugachev's following was a varied lot, ranging from serfs and tribesmen to small landholders and petty merchants. What held them together was a common hatred of the nobility and of the existing social order. Whether prosperous or impoverished, all were victims of the so-called aristocratic reaction which followed the emancipation of the gentry from obligatory service. For serfs this had meant closer supervision and heavier exactions, for state peasants the threat of conversion to serfs, for Cossacks and *odnodvortsy* the barring of their ascent to the nobility, for tribesmen further encroachments on their shrinking domains. All had been overtaken by the juggernaut of modernization, by the growth of the centralized state and of a more sophisticated economy of which they were not the beneficiaries. All had suffered a loss of autonomy and status as well as of economic prosperity. And all, as a result, looked back to a lost past which they yearned to recapture.

Pugachev was fully alive to their grievances; indeed, he himself shared them. And in a language they dreamed of hearing he put forward a program which played on each group's aspirations while promising land, liberty, and equality to all. But the aims of his followers were not always egalitarian. Said one captured rebel: "Who Pugachev was did not trouble us, nor did we even care to know. We rose in order to come out on top and take the place of those who had tormented us. We wanted to be masters and to choose our own faith. But we lost. What's to be done? Their luck is our misfortune. Had we won, we would have had our own tsar and occupied whatever rank and station we desired." Another said he knew Pugachev was a simple Cossack but "served him faithfully, hoping that when he conquered the state, he, Ulianov, would become a great man."[95] Such sentiments, however, were strongest among the Cossacks and *odnodvortsy*, whose chief aim was to raise their status. Among the rural and

urban poor, by contrast, social equality remained an instinctive and deeply rooted virtue.

It was a diverse and loose-knit movement that Pugachev inspired during his five-week sweep down the Volga. From Kazan to Cherny Yar hundreds of bands sprang up, with little or no central control, a "*Pugachevshchina* without Pugachev," as several historians have described it. Ranging in size from a handful to several hundred (twenty or thirty was considered quite large), they were led by self-styled "*atamans*" or "colonels" who acted independently but invoked Peter III's name. Some of the leaders went so far as to call themselves the emperor. In a Penza village, for instance, "Peter Fyodorovich" was a local peasant named Ivanov, a fact of which his followers were aware, but so desperately did they crave a deliverer that they "fell on their knees and swore an oath of loyalty to the sovereign." [96] Little effort was made by the scattered contingents to consolidate their forces or to coordinate their operations. Nor did they attempt to secure a territorial base from which to extend their movement into the center. The rebellion, rather, remained splintered in hundreds of local risings in which the overriding object was plunder. Peasants normally confined their activity to their own villages, settling old scores with the landlords or bailiffs, but sometimes they went to the larger towns to join the marauding "Cossacks," and in a few cases they were recruited by forced levy into the roving partisan detachments. In every Volga district granaries were pillaged, livestock confiscated, timber felled, and manor houses burned. In the towns treasuries were emptied and the houses of the wealthy sacked and burned. "You cannot imagine the intensity with which the whole population of this region are rebelling," reported one government commander.[97]

Acts of violence occurred on an unparalleled scale. For the growth of serfdom, now at its apogee, had sharpened class antagonisms, and hatred of the nobility was never so strong. Where Bolotnikov, Razin, and Bulavin could invite the gentry to join them, for Pugachev this was quite unthinkable. His one conciliatory gesture came at the start of the rebellion when, surprisingly, he considered compensating landowners for the seizure of their estates.[98] But such generosity was short-lived. By the time the revolt reached the Volga, the gateway to peasant

Russia, it had changed to bitter hostility, sending the gentry fleeing from their homes in terror. Besides the development of serfdom, the widening cultural gap between master and serf played a part, not to mention the traditional hatred of boyars and officials, so that any significant collaboration, as had occurred in the past, was out of the question. Few nobles, then, could be found among the insurgents. In one band, captured in September 1774, only three of a hundred were from the gentry, and even this was exceptional.[99] Those who did join came mostly from the lower ranks, and though one can only speculate about their motives, few if any were prototypes of the "conscience-stricken" noblemen of the following century, moved by compassion for the poor and by a need for personal repentance. On the contrary, some were clearly tempted by material gain, some (like the villain of *The Captain's Daughter*) were paying off private grudges, while others served under duress: Ensign Mikhail Shvanovich, a captured grenadier who drafted a letter in German to the governor of Orenburg, apparently did so to save his own neck.[100]

Pugachev's own hatred of the gentry was unbridled. As he moved down the Volga he issued numerous appeals to exterminate the landlords, which helps account for the violence committed against them. His famous July manifesto called on the peasants to "seize them, punish them, hang them, treat them in the same way as they, having no Christian feeling, oppressed you." Bounties were promised for their scalps, and serfs were told to "take their homes and estates as your reward." [101] Thus, with the "emperor's" seal of approval, a great manhunt took place, and gentry blood was spilled as never before. Landlords and their families were tortured, strangled, drowned, impaled, set aflame, beaten to death, or conveyed to rebel headquarters for execution by hanging. In the towns of the Volga hundreds of officers and bureaucrats were seized and executed. Occasionally Pugachev himself held court, sitting on a portable throne guarded by Cossacks with axes. All told, several thousand landlords, officials, merchants, and priests lost their lives during the terrible summer of 1774. The figures given by General P. I. Panin were 1572 gentry (including many wives and children), 1037 officers and officials, and 237 clergymen. Other sources reckoned the total at 2791, among them a scattering of peasants who were com-

paratively well off or who were loyal to their masters, though such cases were not numerous. None of the available estimates is complete, however, and the actual figure probably exceeded 3000. Startling though this is, during the same period, according to Panin, 10,000 rebels were killed and almost as many captured.[102]

What stands out regarding the gentry victims is that most of them were small landholders. Of the 392 estates attacked in Voronezh province (which included the large districts of Tambov and Shatsk) more than half had less than 50 male serfs; and, even more significant, of the 54 proprietors who were killed only three owned more than 100 serfs.[103] This was partly because the larger estates were better defended—in some cases even with light artillery—and partly because their owners were often absentees who lived in the cities or on other estates in the central provinces which the rebellion failed to reach. Another reason was simply that the number of small estates in the Volga region, indeed throughout the country, was very large. The majority of landowners in Penza province, for instance, owned fewer than 20 male serfs, and a third of all the proprietors of European Russia as a whole had no more than half that number.[104] But the character of the petty nobility also played a part. Like their counterparts in France, the so-called sparrow hawks, they were usually more grasping and made heavier demands on their peasants than the larger proprietors. This was especially true in the black-soil districts, where the small landlords were heavily in debt and where *barshchina* was emerging as the chief peasant obligation. For all these reasons the minor nobility became the objects of the strongest animosity and the most horrifying acts of revenge.

In its cyclonic fury the *Pugachevshchina* surpassed the most terrible scenes of Razin's revolt a century before. "Everyone was gripped with fear," wrote an eyewitness. "Death hung continually over the heads of the landowners. All of them fled their estates, and the estates were laid waste."[105] The worst violence occurred in such areas as Alatyr, Saransk, Penza, Tambov, and Kerensk, where memories of Razin were still alive. In these districts, observed General Golitsyn, the destruction was immense and a "large number of gentry perished." Another officer reported seeing "countless bodies" everywhere—hanged, decapitated, mutilated.[106] In Penza province alone there were 600 victims, while more than 300 were massacred in Saransk. On July 27 a rebel mob attacked the provincial seat of Saransk and in a drunken spree—alcohol often magnified the violence—hanged the town's leading aristocrat, a retired general named Sipiagin, along with 62 others. In the province of Alatyr a resourceful officer was able to save a few lives only by telling the peasants that it was forbidden to kill their masters themselves but that they should bring them into town, where Pugachev would pay them ten rubles for each male and five for each female. Since the pretender was indeed known to offer such bounties, this advice was accepted, giving some of the landlords a chance to flee. Elsewhere local peasants and tribesmen used the opportunity to settle old accounts, however petty, with the most brutal methods. In one town, for instance, a rebel party invaded a government distillery and hanged its manager on the complaint of local Mordva that he had refused to pay for wood which they had delivered. After consuming a quantity of wine the raiders proceeded to slaughter three more employees, an example of how alcohol increased the violence.

Apart from the killing, the plunder and destruction of property were more extensive than ever. Whole herds of cattle were seized or driven off, stores of grain confiscated, and money, clothing, and valuables taken in large quantities. At one estate the peasants unearthed a cache of 10,000 rubles, which they divided in equal shares. But manor houses were attacked for more than booty. Title deeds, account books, and tax rolls went up in smoke, and gentry factories were torn down with the same destructive passion with which the Bashkirs had wrecked the enterprises of the Urals. The smashing of dishes, porcelain, and statuary, moreover, bespoke not only the rage of the peasants but their determination to drive their oppressors from their lives with all their alien works.

Unfortunately for the victims, there were few government troops to stop the devastation and slaughter. And those who were available often were local tribesmen or state peasants of poor quality and dubious loyalty. In only a few districts, such as Shatsk, for example, were self-defense units formed, with gentry or Tatar *murzy* as cavalry and their peasants as infantry armed with axes and pikes. Most landowners fled to the towns, spreading panic with tales of the horrors they had witnessed. In Saransk, a

province which experienced heavy destruction, "not one nobleman thought of self-defense," complained Mikhelson, "but all of them scattered like sheep into the woods." [107] Many were afraid to arm their serfs, warning that it was a dangerous practice which might backfire. "They will be the first to go over," wrote Andrei Bolotov, "and turn their weapons against us." The whole nobility was gripped with terror: "Thoughts about Pugachev never left our heads, and we were all convinced that all the vulgar rabble, and especially our own bondsmen and servants, secretly sympathized with the scoundrel and in their hearts were all in revolt and ready at the tiniest spark to burst into flames." [108] The rebels showed no mercy for peasants who aided their master. They threatened to impale even those who continued to pay him dues or till his fields, let alone take up arms in his defense. Following a raid on his estate, one landowner lamented that he had lost not only his family and possessions but all his peasants who showed him the least compassion.[109]

Yet some humane landlords were protected by their serfs, the Radishchev estate near Penza being a case in point. Though Alexander Radishchev, the "Russian *philosophe*" whom Catherine was to banish to Siberia for favoring the abolition of serfdom, was away at the time, the serfs concealed his father in the woods and disguised his younger brothers and sisters as peasant children until the danger had passed. But few families were so fortunate. Landlords found on their estates, however well liked by their serfs, were seldom spared. "I cannot adequately express to your excellency," wrote Mikhelson to General Panin, "how much hatred lies rooted in the hearts of these people. All the barbarities in these villages against the gentry and other worthy men have been committed with the aid of the peasants, who try by every means to catch the masters and bailiffs hiding in the forests and to convey them to Pugachev to be hanged." [110] More typical than the case of the Radishchevs was that of the Mertvago family of Alatyr province, one of whom, a boy of fourteen, survived to describe the nightmare he experienced. In July 1774 the peasants of the district, aroused by news of Pugachev's coming, went on a rampage of burning and looting and hanged the bailiff of an adjoining estate. Fleeing to the woods, the Mertvagos sent a servant to the village for supplies, which only brought a posse

in pursuit. Shouts of hostile voices and the whistling of bullets sent the family scurrying for safety. The boy, separated from the rest, lay silent, terrified, till finally caught by a peasant. He promised a reward for his release when order should be restored. "Liar!" the peasant snarled. "That will never be—your time is past." Brought to Alatyr, he was rescued from death by the arrival of government forces. Though reunited with his mother, brothers, and sisters, he learned that his father had been overtaken in the forest and hanged. A similar account was left by a German tutor on a large estate near Arzamas: murder of a neighboring landowner with his wife and daughter, headlong flight into the forest, terror, near capture, and ultimate rescue.[111]

While similar scenes were being repeated up and down the Volga valley, Pugachev continued on his southerly trek, encountering few government troops and little resistance from the local populace. Everywhere he went he received the same enthusiastic reception. Innumerable processions greeted him with bread and salt, icons and crosses, and the jubilant clanging of church bells. Most of the larger towns opened their gates at his approach and surrendered without a struggle. Those that chose to resist—and even some that did not—were given over to plunder. Jails were thrown open, treasuries pillaged, officials hanged, houses ransacked, warehouses emptied, and wine and salt distributed free to the poor. As he went from town to town Pugachev gathered adherents. His own detachment, which numbered 800 at Saransk, swelled to 2000 at Penza and more than 4000 at Saratov, where he rejoined the path of the river. In the meantime, his agents fanned out toward the central provinces in an effort to extend the rebellion. In the district of Kaluga, not far from Moscow, the gentry were put on the alert against possible outbreaks. Serpukhov and Kolomna redoubled their watch for rebel agitators, and roadblocks were set up throughout the area at which all strangers and transients, all "lower types of men" and all "who shout and sing songs," were stopped for questioning. At the same time Catherine ordered 70,000 rifles from the factories at Tula to keep the gunsmiths busy so that "for four years or more they will not raise a rumpus." [112]

Penza and Saratov were the last major towns that Pugachev entered unopposed. For lack of adequate defenses and fear of

their lives and possessions the merchants at both places decided not to resist. Some, in fact, especially those who were of Old Believer or *odnodvortsy* background, gave the rebels a warm reception. At Penza a lavish banquet was held in Pugachev's honor, attended by many merchants and town officials, including the mayor. Those who refused to cooperate met a violent end. A dozen loyal noblemen and the military commander barricaded themselves in the latter's house but were smoked out and executed. In Saratov a bitter dispute broke out over whether to resist or surrender. The town had been largely destroyed in a fire a few months before, leaving the inhabitants virtually defenseless. The argument, at any rate, ended abruptly with the first rebel volley. On August 6 the gates were thrown open and there began a three-day orgy of drinking and looting in which an enormous treasury was seized, as well as large stores of flour and oats, much of which was distributed free to the lower classes.

It was at Saratov that Pugachev publicly recognized his first wife, a sign that, for all his success on the Volga, the pretender's powers were waning. In just a few days, in fact, catastrophe would overtake him. Meanwhile, however, at Dmitrievsk na Kamyshinke, which he occupied on August 11, a small incident occurred which typified the nature of the rebellion. Pugachev learned that a member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, an astronomer named Löwitz, was taking levels nearby for the projected canal between the Volga and the Don which Peter the Great had begun earlier in the century. Unfortunately for Löwitz, a scientist from St. Petersburg with a German name, he represented everything the rebels loathed and distrusted. Pugachev had him brought before him and, informed that he was an astronomer, ordered his men to lift him up on their pikes "in order that he may be nearer the stars," in which position he was cut to pieces.[113] Soon afterward the insurgents raided a neighboring colony of German settlers, whose presence the local peasantry had resented ever since Catherine invited them into the area.[114] This, however, was Pugachev's last successful venture. When he reached Tsaritsyn and the portage to the Don, his days were already numbered. The final act of the rising was about to begin.

7. Defeat

As he neared his home territory, Pugachev's hopes of winning the support of his fellow Don Cossacks, as Razin and Bulavin had done, ran high. From Dmitrievsk he ordered three detachments to sweep down the Medveditsa, the Ilovlia, and the Khoper, the main tributaries of the upper Don, in an effort to ignite the area, while the bulk of his army continued down the Volga toward Tsaritsyn. At the same time he appealed to the Don Cossacks to join his movement, promising to eliminate "German" customs and to restore their autonomy, subsidies, and old ritual. In a few upstream settlements his emissaries were met "not only with bread and salt but also with flags."[115] But the participation of the Host failed to materialize. In the first place, peace with Turkey was concluded on July 10, and seasoned regiments—one of them led by Colonel Ilya Denisov, who during the Seven Years' War had had Pugachev flogged for losing his horse—were rushed to the Don to form a barrier against the rebels. Furthermore, owing to bad harvests and to the demands of the war, food on the Don was extremely scarce, and the Cossacks were reluctant to share what little they had with the insurgents. But the underlying reason was a transformation in the character of the Host. Over the past century, although divisions between the oligarchy and the rank and file persisted, the Don community had gradually evolved from its former turbulence to a more settled life with substantial agricultural and commercial interests. Indeed, it was because of this change that the torch of rebellion had passed to the volatile Yaik Cossacks, whose frontier existence resembled that of their Don cousins three or four generations earlier. For all these reasons few Don Cossacks responded to Pugachev's appeal for help. The overwhelming majority, following their *ataman* and elders, remained loyal to the government, and some actually joined in suppressing the revolt, for which they received an appreciative letter from the empress.[116]

Meanwhile the peasants too were losing their taste for rebellion. For one thing, the conclusion of peace with the Turks took the edge off popular discontent. But more important was the lack of grain and livestock created in large measure by the general pandemonium. By the middle of August famine on the

Volga had sapped the strength and enthusiasm of the rebel bands. The population of the area, reported Count Pavel Panin, Catherine's new commander-in-chief, was reduced to eating shrubs, acorns, and moss.[117]

At the same time, victory over the Turks gave the government new confidence in dealing with the insurrection. It was on July 29 that General Panin, the victor of Bender and younger brother of Catherine's foreign minister, was put in charge of the suppression. Shortly thereafter, experienced troops were transferred from the front "to wipe out the villainous insurgents." [118] In the middle of August Panin issued a manifesto denouncing Pugachev as a "man of Hell in whom, without doubt, there lies the spirit of evil that is inimical to human nature." [119] Panin promised amnesty to rebels who laid down their arms, and he offered money and exemption from taxes and recruitment to whoever turned in the pretender either dead or alive. As in the past, moreover, the church was called into service against the rebels. Pugachev and his accomplices were anathematized by the Holy Synod and condemned to "eternal damnation." A circular went out to parish priests reminding them of their sacred duty to oppose the insurgents. Pugachev, it read, was a chosen instrument of the Devil, "a wolf who falls upon the sheep of Christ's flock." A second proclamation warned that only damnation awaited the imposter's supporters: "He is the scourge of humanity. He is an enemy of God and the Church and the fatherland. Pay him no heed if you wish to hold the keys to the Kingdom of Heaven and eternal salvation." [120]

Meanwhile Pugachev experienced the first serious setback of his Volga campaign. Arriving at Tsaritsyn on August 21, he expected it to follow the example of the upstream towns and yield without resistance. But the garrison, reinforced by a contingent of Don Cossacks, launched a heavy bombardment which compelled him to withdraw. While he regrouped his forces for a second attack, a message arrived with news of Mikhelson's approach. Breaking off his maneuvers, Pugachev fled down the Volga toward Cherny Yar, with the Muscovites in pursuit. Though he outnumbered his adversary by more than six to one, his men were hungry and exhausted, and their quality was never poorer. Of some 6000 adherents only 300 were Cossacks

and even fewer were Bashkir horsemen or Urals workers with mortars and cannon. The majority were poorly armed peasants, some traveling with their families in slow-moving wagons. As for the rest—tribesmen, convicts, boatmen, "and other scum," in the description of a hostile observer [121]—their military capacity was scarcely any better; indeed, their hopeless inefficiency against a disciplined army would soon make itself felt.

Mikhelson was clearly the pretender's most formidable opponent. With his small regiment he dogged the insurgents relentlessly, allowing them no respite. "From January 1774," in the words of a French contemporary,

> he pursued the rebels without intermission, how numerous soever their swarms, how remote the expedition, and whatever fortune attended his enterprise. It almost exceeds belief with what toilsome perseverance Mikhelson pursued his march over the deserts of trackless snow, without a guide, without succours, at times almost without food; how his company, always small, and often spent with fatigue, whenever they met with the great host of the rebels, always attacked, and always beat them: only by the prudence and the bravery of the colonel, and the confidence he had acquired from his troops.[122]

That this tribute was well deserved Mikhelson now showed in his last and most decisive victory. On August 24, after a three-day forced march, he caught up with the rebels a dozen miles above Cherny Yar. In a desperate maneuver Pugachev turned on his pursuer and charged in full strength. But Mikhelson stood his ground and, mounting a fierce counterattack, sent his opponent reeling. After a brief struggle Pugachev was completely routed. His motley army had been cut to pieces, with thousands killed or captured and all their cannon taken. What was left of his following, except for a battered remnant, quickly melted away. But the pretender again escaped, driven into the Urals, from which, rumor had it, he intended to follow the path of Nekrasov and flee to Persia or Turkey.

For his triumph over the rebels Mikhelson was lavishly rewarded, receiving a large estate near Vitebsk with a thousand serfs, as well as the Order of St. George and promotion to full colonel. Like Bibikov before him, he was the hero of the aris-

tocracy, lionized for his courage and for the efficiency with which he had defeated the enemy. In glowing terms the German tutor from Arzamas paid tribute to Mikhelson's achievement. "I must confess," he wrote of the victory, "that this piece of news brought me greater joy than I had ever experienced in my life. Proud of the German name of our deliverer, my heart overflowed with admiration for his character, and as long as I live I shall pronounce the name of Mikhelson with the utmost respect." [123]

But Pugachev was still at large, having disappeared into the no-man's-land east of the Volga. To his fellow survivors he proposed fleeing south to Turkey or west to Zaporozhie or across the Urals into Siberia. But all such thoughts were rejected. Tired and hungry and embittered by their defeat, his confederates fell to quarreling. Some said it was "better to abandon our lawlessness and transgressions and to accept our well-earned execution rather than perish unrepentant on the steppe like wild animals." [124] Disillusioned with their leader, they began to question his identity before the others. If he is the true sovereign, they asked, why did he suffer defeat? Why is he unable to write his name? And why do the Don Cossacks call him Emelian Ivanovich? Having raised these doubts, they decided it was better not to die at all for a false messiah. Instead they would turn him in and save their own necks.

Thus it was that Pugachev, like Razin and Bulavin before him, was betrayed by his fellow Cossacks. He was seized with his wife and children and brought to Yaitsk and put in irons. From Yaitsk he was taken under heavy guard to Simbirsk, where Panin was anxious to question him. There, after preliminary interrogation, he was put in an iron cage specially built for the occasion and carried like a wild beast to Moscow. The cage being too small, Pugachev was forced to crouch throughout the long journey; and in this position, clothed in rags and inspiring more pity than awe, he arrived in the old capital. All Moscow went out to have a look at him, recalled Andrei Bolotov, and gaped "as at some sort of monster." [125] In government circles his capture was greeted with jubilation. "The marquis," wrote Catherine sardonically, "has been caught, shackled, and imprisoned"; he is "trussed and bound like a bear, and in Moscow a scaffold awaits him." In a letter to Voltaire, however, she conceded that Pugachev was "an uncommonly brave and resourceful person," though illiterate and as destructive as Tamerlane.[126] The poet Sumarokov composed a special ode on the occasion of his capture, and in Kazan portraits of the pretender were burned in a triumphant celebration.

Meanwhile General Panin had been given unlimited powers of repression, and he was using them to the hilt. Lest severity should touch off fresh outbursts, Catherine entered a mild plea for clemency, directing that "executions not take place save in extreme circumstances." [127] But her halfhearted recommendation did not weigh heavily, given the mood of revenge which gripped the nobility after the massacres on the Volga. In a fury of reprisal whole villages were leveled and, in addition to gibbets and breakwheels, wooden *glagoli* were erected, special devices in the shape of the Russian "G" with metal hooks for hanging victims by the rib. Cossacks, tribesmen, and peasants were flogged and tortured; their nostrils were slit and their ears torn off; their foreheads were branded and their hair and beards shorn. The fortunate got off with beatings and fines. In a typical case from the files of the secret police, a peasant named Rodion Loshkarev was sentenced to fifty strokes of the knout and exile at forced labor "because he willingly joined the rebel mob, received the rank of *ataman*, and returned to his village of Baikalovskoe with a copy of a sham manifesto from which he proclaimed the monster Pugachev to be Emperor Peter III; and he incited the peasants to steal money and wine and to pillage the home of Assessor Bryzgalov, whose books and papers they burned." [128] It was several months before the whirlwind of punishment had spent itself, during which tens of thousands were killed or banished at hard labor. In Bashkiria the revolt continued long after Pugachev's capture. General Suvorov, who arrived on the scene after the pretender's defeat, was sent to pacify the tribesmen. A determined effort was made to track down the principal leaders, notably Kinzia and Salavat. The former vanished without a trace, but Salavat was not so fortunate. At the end of November he was surrounded and captured in the woods

and taken to Ufa, where he was branded, beaten with the knout, and sent in chains with his father to Rogervik, a traditional place of deportation for rebellious Bashkirs. As late as 1797 both were still alive, according to a recently discovered list of prisoners, as was Pugachev's secretary Ivan Pochitalin.[129]

At the end of December Pugachev was tried in the Kremlin by a court of landowners, officials, and high-ranking clergy. The outcome was hardly in doubt. "In a few days the farce of the Marquis de Pugachev will be over," wrote Catherine on December 21. "His sentence is already prepared—only a few formalities must be observed." [130] The pretender's sole defense was to try to shift the blame to the Yaik Cossacks who, so he claimed, had made a pawn of him and now sought to use him as a scapegoat. Whatever truth lay in these charges, they were of no avail. The court announced the anticipated sentence: "Emelian Pugachev will be quartered, his head mounted on a stake, the parts of his body carried to the four quarters of the city and put on wheels and then burned." [131]

There was one small concession, however. The empress, who had already refused to allow torture at Pugachev's interrogation and trial, directed the executioner to decapitate him first rather than quarter him alive, lest he should become, like Razin, too much of a popular martyr. Some influential aristocrats, by contrast, wanted to make an example of the pretender and to strike terror in the lower classes by administering the severest punishment. Prince A. A. Viazemsky, the procurator of the Senate, wrote Catherine that even quartering was not enough. He urged her to break Pugachev on the wheel "and thereby distinguish him from the others," namely the four Yaik Cossacks—Shigaev, Perfiliev, Padurov, and Tornov—who were to be executed with him.[132] But her orders were carried out. On January 10, 1775, Pugachev was taken to a square on the banks of the Moscow River below the Kremlin walls. There he was beheaded at a blow and then quartered. His head was mounted on a pike and the sections of his body put on wheels and exposed in different parts of Moscow for all to see. The next day the scaffold and the wheels were burned. The execution was witnessed by a large crowd. So many noblemen attended that Andrei Bolotov, noting

that Pugachev had revolted chiefly against that class, called the spectacle "the true triumph of the gentry over this their common foe and villain." [133]

It remains to describe the fate of Pugachev's accomplices. Apart from the four who were executed with him, Zarubin was beheaded in Ufa and Beloborodov in Moscow. Lesser figures, such as Miasnikov and Kozhevnikov, were exiled to Siberia or the far north, while the nine Cossacks who had betrayed the impostor were pardoned. Pugachev's three children and both his wives were imprisoned in the fortress of Keksgolm, which they were never to leave. They were still listed on prison records as late as 1796, the year that Catherine died. One daughter survived until 1834. That year Tsar Nicholas I, hearing that Pushkin was writing a history of Pugachev, informed him that the pretender's sister had just died, meaning, of course, his daughter, who had languished in the Keksgolm dungeons for sixty years.[134]

Catherine, by a series of edicts, vainly sought to erase the memory of the pretender. On January 15, 1775, five days after his execution, she decreed that the Yaik River be renamed the Ural, the Yaik Cossacks the Ural Cossacks, and their capital city Uralsk. Zimoveiskaya Stanitsa, the birthplace of both Pugachev and Razin, was moved to the other side of the Don and renamed Potemkinskaya after the empress's favorite. What remained of Cossack independence was largely destroyed. The Zaporozhian and Volga Cossacks were transferred to the Kuban and the Caucasus, and a permanent garrison was installed in Uralsk, where the Cossacks were reorganized and henceforth kept under tight government control. Finally, by an edict of March 15, 1775, all matters concerning the rebellion were consigned to "eternal oblivion and profound silence." [135]

Yet, for all these measures, traces of the rising remained long after. Though an amnesty was granted at the end of 1775, sporadic flare-ups occurred on the Volga the following spring and summer. As late as 1778 Sir James Harris, the new British ambassador, warned that the sparks of discontent "are not yet extinguished; and it is much to be apprehended, that, in case of any national calamity, they would blow out afresh." [136] For the remainder of Catherine's reign the peasants were fairly quiet,

but the three-year rule of her son Paul saw nearly 300 disturbances in 32 provinces, often requiring stringent repressions to put them down. The memory of Pugachev and his forerunners could not be eradicated. It was to survive not only in the scattered outbursts of the nineteenth century but in the great upheavals of 1905 and 1917, and even beyond, as the next chapter of this work will attempt to show.

8. Conclusion

The revolt of Pugachev was the last and the most famous of the Cossack and peasant risings which shook the Russian state during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was, indeed, the most formidable mass upheaval in all of Europe between the Puritan and French revolutions, and the largest in Russia prior to the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, surpassing its predecessors in scope and violence, claiming the greatest number of gentry victims, and leaving a specter to haunt future generations of landlords and officials. In most respects, however, Pugachev's rising conformed to the pattern of its forerunners. It was an extremely complex affair, combining a Cossack mutiny with social rebellion, religious protest, and anticolonial resistance. Its immediate cause, the dispute on the Yaik, was of course unique; but its long-range causes—the rise of serfdom and autocracy, the heavy burdens of war, the loss of land and freedom and of former habits and customs—were the same as in the past. Once again, it was a sectional as well as a social conflict, pitting the expanding center against the vanishing frontier. In geographical terms the *Pugachevshchina* was probably the most extensive rising Russia had ever known, engulfing the whole basin of the middle Volga together with the Yaik valley and the southern and central Urals, an eruption vaster than even Razin's a century before. Pugachev's greatest strength lay in the newly colonized region east of the Volga and Kama, where government conquest had been too recent and too rapid to be secure. The pretender's pledge to make Yaitsk his capital was a token of the sectional nature of the conflict. But his failure to penetrate the center, the territory within the

Oka perimeter, spelled the downfall of his movement. As a result, regional autonomy continued to decline under the weight of the expanding autocracy, and by the end of the eighteenth century there was no more "untamed steppe" except in central Asia or the remote stretches of Siberia.

The extension of the Russian frontier heralded the final destruction of Cossack independence. By the middle of the eighteenth century, after the defeats of Razin and Bulavin, the Don community had fallen within the orbit of government control. Now the Yaik Host met the same fate. The failure of Pugachev's revolt sounded the death knell of Cossack autonomy. In the aftermath the Cossacks were transplanted to remote corners of the empire or reduced to loyal instruments of the central government. The Cossack oligarchies came more and more to resemble their former gentry rivals, while the rank and file were gradually deprived of much that distinguished them from ordinary peasants. Flight beyond the Caucasus, following Nekrasov's example, became the only means of escape, but few were attracted by the prospect of starting life anew in an alien land and subject to the whims of an alien monarch. Henceforth the Cossacks ceased to be the catalysts of social rebellion. The wind from the steppe, as a modern historian has noted, would carry no more firebrands to the towns and villages farther north.[137] On the contrary, the Cossacks became a pillar of the autocracy, a praetorian guard to quell popular disturbances, a symbol of imperial authority rather than of freedom and independence as before. In the future the prophets of revolt would spring from a new class of radical intellectuals, "Pugachevs of the university," as Joseph de Maistre dubbed them.[138]

Yet, for all these similarities with the revolts of the past, there were a number of significant differences. For one thing the element of banditry was less conspicuous, especially in comparison with Razin's movement, though the looting of towns and estates took place on a wide scale. For another—and this is perhaps the most striking difference—the *Pugachevshchina* failed to take firm root in the towns, where Bolotnikov and Razin had won their greatest support. Of the more important Urals cities only Cheliabinsk was occupied by the insurgents, and even that for a short period. The same was true on the Volga, where rebel detach-

ments moved swiftly from one town to the next, never establishing a solid territorial base from which to extend their activities into the heartland. The reasons for this have already been noted, the most important being that with the passage of time the frontier towns had lost much of their turbulent character and had evolved a more settled population with a larger stake in social stability. Moreover, with the rise of trade and manufacture and the emergence of a nationwide market, merchants and craftsmen developed stronger ties with the center, such as the commercial towns of northern Russia had enjoyed since the sixteenth century, making them bulwarks of the Muscovite order.

The social composition of the revolt was much the same as in the past, with Cossacks, peasants, and tribesmen constituting the bulk of the adherents. Yet here too there were noticeable differences. To begin with, Pugachev's was the first of the mass revolts to include a significant proletarian element, foreshadowing, however dimly, the revolutions of the twentieth century. The ascribed workers of the Urals, it is true, retained their peasant identity and outlook; but they were early prototypes of the future industrial workers. Moreover, by manufacturing arms for the rebels without the help of factory administrators, they not only played a key role in the rebellion but inaugurated a primitive form of workers' control which anticipated the more sophisticated experiments of 1917. The Bashkirs, too, took part in unprecedented numbers, continuing their century-long revolt against Russian colonization. Bulavin's outbreak, it will be recalled, had coincided with a large-scale Bashkir rising. But now the two movements —Russian and Bashkir—were combined under a single banner. It was the first time that such an alliance had been concluded—and also the last. The defeat of Pugachev marked an important step in Russia's eastward expansion at the expense of the seminomadic tribes beyond the Volga.

Another group which joined forces with the Cossacks for both the first and last time were the *odnodvortsy* homesteaders, whose participation in the *Pugachevshchina* was a last-ditch effort to recover their independence. They failed, however, and over the next few decades they rapidly faded from view, merging by and large with the state peasantry or the petty tradesmen of the provincial towns. A large proportion of the *odnodvortsy*, as well as of the Yaik Cossacks, were Old Believers, who occupied

a prominent place in a mass uprising for the second time in the century. Yet the extent of their participation must not be exaggerated. Most schismatics, apart from Cossacks and homesteaders, preferred nonviolent methods of protest against government persecution. They shrank from open rebellion not only on religious grounds but also out of concern for their own possessions, many of them enjoying considerable prosperity as merchants and tradesmen. In some cases, potential supporters were alienated by the excesses of Pugachev's followers, by their indiscriminate killing and destruction, or they were mollified by Catherine's comparatively enlightened attitude toward religious nonconformity, and therefore maintained a passive stance throughout the revolt. As for Pugachev himself, he was probably not an Old Believer but merely exploited religious grievances as a means of drawing adherents into his camp. He issued appeals to the Old Believers, as he did to Moslems and Orthodox Christians, to broaden his base of support.

Whatever their religious affiliation, disaffected elements in the empire shared a common desire to recapture an idyllic past. They looked back with nostalgic yearning to a Garden of Eden before the emergence of centralized autocracy. More than anything else, it was this desire that Pugachev attempted to satisfy. His program, though somewhat more elaborate than those of his predecessors, was still rather vague and primitive. As Catherine put it, he promised his followers "castles in the air." [139] He was not opposed to tsardom itself but to the unbearable shape it had recently assumed. Like Razin before him, he aimed to inaugurate a popular government with a popular tsar. Above all, this meant eliminating the tyrannical landlords and officials, converting the serfs into state peasants with free use of the land, and replacing the autocracy with local self-rule in the Cossack manner. His propaganda, however, seemed better calculated to arouse a thirst for revenge than to present a clear vision of the future society. Serfdom being further developed, class antagonisms were correspondingly sharper; and his leaflets and manifestoes inspired a greater destructive passion, particularly among the peasantry, than ever before. At the same time, his was a cultural protest as well as a Cossack mutiny and a peasant jacquerie. His program, like those of Razin and Bulavin, was a reflection of growing nativist resentment against foreign innovations and the modernization of

Russian life, resentment which found expression in popular hatred of German officers and bureaucrats—the Traubenbergs and Freimans, the Reinsdorps and Brandts—not to speak of the murder of the astronomer Löwitz or the raiding of German settlements on the lower Volga. But cultural antagonisms took a back place to economic and social grievances and must not be given undue emphasis.

As before, myths and rumors occupied a central place in the rebellion. What is remarkable, however, is that the same myth —of a just tsar whom the aristocracy had conspired to eliminate in order to oppress the people—should have dominated all four upheavals spanning nearly two centuries. It was the persistence of this legend that paved the way for the appearance of a pretender—indeed, as in the Time of Troubles, a whole series of pretenders—which attests to the people's faith in a messianic ruler who would rescue them from their tormentors. But this time there was a difference, for Pugachev, unlike his forerunners, did not claim merely to represent the legitimate sovereign; instead he cast himself in the role, which may help to account for his large following.

Yet he never stirred the popular imagination as much as Razin had. Nor did he command the same devotion or acquire so exalted a place in folklore and legend. This is not easy to explain. Men were perhaps more deeply impressed by Razin's swashbuckling adventures or moved to greater compassion by his more terrible death. Moreover, with none of Pugachev's imperial trappings to taint his image, Razin perhaps seemed a truer "peasant tsar," even if he himself never claimed the role. Pugachev, some may have felt, was animated as much by personal ambition as by compassion for the oppressed. Indeed, the followers of Bakunin in the 1870s sometimes distinguished between the two great rebels, criticizing Pugachev's statist pretensions while praising Razin's selfless devotion to the poor. Yet the "third emperor" was, after all, a product of his times. Coming a century after Razin, he reflected the values of imperial rather than of Muscovite Russia, and behaved as he thought "Peter Fyodorovich" himself would have done.

This, however, is by no means to suggest that Pugachev was not a popular figure. On the contrary, he was widely regarded as Razin's legitimate heir. When he appeared among the Yaik Cossacks, noted a contemporary observer, he "renewed to their imagination the transactions of the Don Cossack Stenka Razin." Nor was the parallel lost on the empress. "His history," she wrote of the pretender, "corresponded exactly to the history of the brigand Stenka Razin." [140] For the lower classes the analogy went even further: he was nothing less than a reincarnation of his predecessor, "the second coming of Razin after a hundred years." [141] The progression from Razin to Pugachev, as has been noted, was a kind of apostolic succession in which the myth of the Christ-like rebel, martyred for the sake of the people, passed from one century to the next. Legend attributes to Pugachev some of the same magical powers which Razin had supposedly possessed—for instance, by drawing a horse on his prison wall he might escape from his enemies.[142] The peasants saw him as their returned messiah and called him (as they had called Razin) their "resplendent sun," a symbol of good against evil, of life against death, of renewal and resurrection. A lament sung in the Urals after Pugachev's execution is a striking illustration of this point:

> Emelian, our own dear father,
> Wherefore have you forsaken us?
> Our resplendent sun has gone down.

In the same spirit, for many years after his death the peasants of Saratov reckoned the date as before or after Pugachev in place of Christ.[143]

Yet, for all his charismatic qualities, Pugachev went down in defeat. And his failure was all too predictable, the reasons being much the same as in the rebellions of the past. Most important, perhaps, was a lamentable absence of unity in the rebel camp. Once again it was a heterogeneous assortment of Cossacks, peasants, and tribesmen that made common cause against the authorities. Although their weapons and organization were somewhat better than before, they were still no match for the trained and disciplined army at the government's disposal. Moreover, the insurgents were plagued by chronic internal rivalries. In the Urals it was a division of interests between the skilled and unskilled workers that prevented unity of action, in addition to which the ascribed peasants were more bent on settling private scores with their employers or on returning to their native vil-

lages than on undertaking the broader task of defeating the government. At the same time, both national and religious differences hampered effective collaboration between Pugachev's Russian and Bashkir followers. At one point tensions ran so high that Salavat was moved to appeal for unity: "In our hearts there is no malice toward Russians. There is no reason for Bashkirs and Russians to quarrel and to destroy each other." [144] But his plea fell on deaf ears. Throughout the rebellion real harmony was never achieved.

Nor was there effective coordination among the scattered rebel detachments. And considerable energy was wasted in pillage and destruction, which reached such a pitch that some of the more prosperous adherents—Bashkir elders, petty merchants, independent peasants—turned in fear against their allies and passed to the government side. Beyond all this, the disappointing response in the towns and the lack of a constructive program have already been noted. Finally, like his predecessors, Pugachev chose to remain in the peripheries rather than attack the vital core of the empire. On this last point Sir Robert Gunning laid special emphasis to account for the pretender's failure:

> the miscreant who was lately the author of so much confusion and devastation was, for want of common understanding, incapable of forming any plan; for had that of marching hither, either occurred, or been suggested to him, and that he had executed it, there is not the least doubt that he would have been joined here by the whole of the populace . . . in which case the flames must have spread through the whole Empire.[145]

For all these reasons Pugachev met the same end as his forerunners. But he, by contrast, had no successors. He was the last of the great Cossack rebels. And for 130 years, though there were numerous local disturbances, the military–bureaucratic state remained sufficiently strong to forestall another general outbreak.

Despite the immense shock of the *Pugachevshchina*, the autocracy emerged unimpaired. To the upper classes, in fact, the traditional justification of absolute rule seemed more persuasive than ever. The urge of the masses for spontaneous rebellion, it was argued, required a strong centralized government to maintain domestic order, not to speak of defending the empire against its foreign enemies. Thus the revolt buttressed the shaky alliance

between crown and gentry against the lower orders of society. Pugachev's appeal for a class war against the nobility led to a healing of the frictions which had plagued the empress throughout the first decade of her reign. Instead of seeking to limit her powers, the aristocracy looked to Catherine for protection against the rebellion. Catherine, in turn, declaring herself the "first landowner" of Russia, relied more heavily on the nobility, who received a corporate status and a wide range of authority in matters of local government.

Pugachev's revolt, coming at the height of the Turkish War, was the most critical moment of Catherine's reign. Afterward she took an increasingly dim view of popular movements wherever they occurred, denouncing the American and French revolutions and describing the deputies of the National Assembly as so many Pugachevs.[146] At the same time, however, the rising brought home to her the need for reform. In a series of measures she lowered the price of salt, eliminated wartime taxes, and amnestied debtors, military deserters, and fugitive state peasants. Already in 1773, the year of Pugachev's outbreak, she had begun to soften government policy toward non-Russian peoples. The revolt gave further impetus to this trend. For the conversion of Moslem tribesmen the authorities relied increasingly on persuasion and incentives. Baptisms were rewarded by exemptions from taxes and conscription, and the construction of mosques and of Moslem schools was permitted over a broad area. The revolt also stimulated reform in the Urals metal factories, where fines and punishments were curtailed, hours reduced, and wages substantially increased. In 1807 the whole system of ascribed labor was finally scrapped.

But above all, the revolt paved the way for the reform of local administration. Under the impact of mass insurrection the inefficiency of the provincial authorities had been glaringly exposed. Officials had panicked and even abandoned their posts, leaving the populace defenseless before the rebel onslaught. Wherever the pretender had encountered firmness, Catherine noted, he had achieved little success, but "weakness, indolence, dereliction of duty, idleness, bribery, disagreements, extortions, and injustice on the part of individual officials" had facilitated the spread of rebellion in many areas.[147] Appalled by the behavior of her ad-

ministrators, the empress introduced a comprehensive reform in the Statute of Provinces of 1775, which aimed at placing the management of local affairs in the hands of the nobility under the general supervision of government representatives.

For the peasantry, however, there was no fundamental relief. On the contrary, their lot became harder than ever. Owing to the extension of serfdom to the Ukraine and to Catherine's grants of state peasants to her favorites, the number of private bondsmen sharply increased. Moreover, the powers of the nobility over their serfs were in no way diminished. Indeed, the bloodshed of 1774 led some to favor even further restrictions on the lower classes. On the other hand there were a few who, either from sympathy or fear, called for the immediate alleviation of the peasantry's plight. Radishchev was the most celebrated case in point. "Enticed by a crude pretender," he wrote in his *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow,*

> they hastened to follow him, and wished only to free themselves from the yoke of their masters and in their ignorance they could think of no other means to do this than to kill their masters. They spared neither sex nor age. They sought more the joy of vengeance than the benefit of broken shackles. This is what awaits us, this is what we must expect. Danger is steadily mounting, peril is already hovering over our heads. Time has already raised its scythe and is only awaiting an opportunity. The first demagogue or humanitarian who rises up to awaken the unfortunate will hasten the scythe's fierce sweep. Beware! [148]

But Radishchev's call went unheeded. He himself was arrested and sent into exile. Catherine, in the end, confined herself to limited measures of reform, and even these were carried through to strengthen her administration in the face of popular discontent. In the long run, perhaps, the fear of another Pugachev revolt helped to bring about the emancipation of the peasantry. But for the time being, autocracy and serfdom remained intact. Indeed, the whole question of fundamental reform was postponed for nearly a century. And by then, it would seem, it was already too late to prevent another popular outbreak on a scale unimagined in the past.

V The Legacy

CATHERINE BRESHKOVSKAYA (future Socialist Revolutionary) as a child: Did you know Pugachev? Did you hear about him?
NURSE: Oh yes, I heard of him, but it is forbidden to chatter too much. What have you to do with Pugachev?

Although the revolts of Pugachev and his predecessors anticipated the great social upheavals of the twentieth century, they belong to an earlier period of Russian history. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Russia saw the rapid growth of the state, which imposed new ideas and institutions upon a reluctant people who remained deeply conservative and steadfast in their resistance to change. At the same time, the monarchy was strengthened and consolidated at the expense of local and regional autonomy. By sheer force and terror the governing elite drove the masses forward, harnessed to the needs of the state.

The result was a civil war between the government and the people, a war in which the victims of triumphant progress—Cossacks, tribesmen, peasants, and other declining groups—sought to regain their former independence. As a rule they limited themselves to passive methods, especially flight, to which Russian geography presented few natural barriers. But in moments of abnormal hardship, such as famine or war, they erupted into open violence which threatened to rend the fabric of society. Perhaps some unusual calamity might furnish the spark, perhaps some new exaction imposed on the peasants or Cossacks, or a sudden change in their status—a transfer to private ownership, a shift from *obrok* to *barshchina,* assignment to factory labor—which broke with established traditions. But the underlying cause, the rise of autocracy and serfdom, was always the same. The state swelled up, as Kliuchevsky put it, while the people shrank.

The state, in the eyes of the people, became an alien and evil tyranny, extorting taxes, exacting military service, and trampling on native customs and traditions. It neither ministered to their welfare nor defended their concept of justice; nor did it perform any other function which seemed vital, or even relevant, to their way of life. Rather, it was an agent of oppressive innovation, a giant octopus, as they saw it, which stifled their independence and squeezed out their life's breath. Yet they always distinguished sharply between the tsar and his advisers. The tsar was their benevolent father, the bearer of justice and mercy, while the boyars were wicked usurpers, demons in human form who throve on the people's enslavement. To eliminate them—to "cleanse" or "remove" them from the land, as rebel propaganda put it—was their devout wish, for only by demolishing the wall of nobles

and bureaucrats, they felt, could the ancient bond with the sovereign, on which their salvation depended, be restored.

Myths of this type, above all the myth of a returning deliverer, played a major part in nearly every popular rebellion from Bolotnikov to Pugachev. For throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the lower classes were hungry for a messiah who would purge the land of suffering and usher in a golden age of abundance and tranquillity that would last forever. To fill this demand there appeared a series of impostors who combined a capacity for military leadership with the qualities of a prophet. The charismatic appeal of a Razin or Pugachev was essential to their gaining a mass following, and long after their death they continued to be regarded as the "good tsar" who, in imitation of Christ, had sacrificed his life to save the poor. Thus when Pushkin asked an old Ural Cossack what he remembered of Pugachev he angrily replied: "For you he is Pugachev, but for me he was the great sovereign, Peter Fyodorovich." [1] Similarly, as we have seen, an ancient Volga peasant in the mid-nineteenth century remained convinced that Pugachev had been the "second coming of Razin after a hundred years." Although Soviet scholars tend to discount the myth of the "good tsar" as the "naive monarchism" of a superstitious peasantry, the rebel leaders themselves (with the exception of Bulavin) considered the presence in their camp of a people's tsar indispensable for winning mass support. Bolotnikov, it will be recalled, went so far as to claim that the dead daughter of Tsar Fyodor was in fact a boy, who having miraculously survived, had joined his campaign against the boyars.

In every case, however, the risings were doomed to defeat. Although rebel propaganda could rouse the heterogeneous masses to revolt, it was incapable of uniting them into a coherent movement. Moreover, for all their mobility and tactics of surprise, the insurgents were joined in an unequal struggle with the expanding military state. Thus each successive rebellion was drowned in blood, the leaders invariably being betrayed by their own followers and turned over to the government to be executed. Nor could the outcome have been different. By resisting the centralization of power the rebels were opposing one of the overriding trends of modern history. They could not reverse a process whose roots ran far deeper than the aristocratic conspiracy to which they

attributed their declining fortunes. And even if they had succeeded in toppling the government, their program of Cossack democracy, the survival of a vanishing age, would have condemned them to destruction by some outside aggressor with a modern military–bureaucratic machine.

What then did the risings accomplish? Spontaneous and ill-organized, they set out with millennial visions and ended in failure and death. Indeed, like all unsuccessful revolts against authoritarian regimes, they achieved the very opposite of their hopes. Each new revolt only carried the government forward and hastened the decline of the old life. Instead of a return to a golden past, to an era of justice and tranquillity, autocracy and serfdom were fastened upon the country more firmly than ever.

Yet the revolts must not be dismissed as mere reactionary outbursts, full of sound and fury but accomplishing nothing. Despite their traditionalist framework and backward-looking orientation, in their determination to sweep away the existing order they were profoundly revolutionary. And though they failed to achieve their goals, they shook the state, terrified the nobility, and ultimately convinced the authorities of the necessity for reform. At the same time, they awakened the revolutionary consciousness of the lower classes and left them with a thirst for vengeance which no conciliatory measure or partial improvement could eliminate. "God save us from a Russian revolt, senseless and merciless." Pushkin's plea was an eloquent testimony to the legacy of the four revolts which—particularly the *Pugachevshchina*, the last and most formidable of the risings—were to serve as an inspiration for future opponents of the autocracy.

Long after Pugachev's death rumors continued to circulate among the Cossacks, peasants, and tribesmen that "Peter Fyodorovich" was still alive, hiding, it was said, in the forests of the Volga valley or the remote hills of Bashkiria or on the Don in the guise of a simple oxherd, and preparing to raise a new army to liberate the poor. Between the time of his execution and the end of Catherine's reign, more than forty cases of rumors of his imminent return—some of which touched off local disturbances—were reported by the secret police. "They caught the fish," as a soldier remarked, "but his teeth still remain." [2]

These rumors, in turn, spawned a rich crop of pretenders, who called themselves Peter III or the Tsarevich Paul. An interesting case occurred in Samara when a Don Cossack spoke about "Pugachev and his mob" to a veteran of the revolt. "Why do you call him Pugachev and his army a mob?" the latter replied. "He was not Pugachev but the third emperor, Peter Fyodorovich. [In fact] he looked very like you." [3] With these words a new impostor was launched on his brief career, which ended in torture and death. But there were others to take his place. Another false Peter III appeared in Kiev in 1787, and in 1800 a Don Cossack was beaten with the knout for boasting that "Pugachev rose up for his homeland but was defeated. I shall do better. When I take up the sword all Russia will tremble." [4]

Nor did the legend die out as the new century unfolded. When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, religious sectarians in Tambov province, a stronghold of agrarian discontent, sent a delegation to greet him, convinced that he had come to "overthrow the false tsar." Some peasants, in fact, saw Napoleon himself as the pretender, who had returned to liberate them; and the Soviet historian Eugene Tarlé suggests that Napoleon might have triumphed had he followed Pugachev's example and proclaimed a general emancipation.[5] In 1825, on the other hand, when Alexander I died in mysterious circumstances, it was rumored that the tsar himself had been the true liberator, who, like Peter III, was about to free the serfs when the gentry decided to get rid of him. His coffin, it was said, contained the body of an ordinary soldier, for the tsar, having escaped his assassins, had gone to wander over the land and share the people's suffering. Similar legends arose during the Decembrist revolt, which was precipitated by Alexander's death. Pavel Pestel, the foremost leader of the rebellion, invoked the old myth that the aristocracy formed "a wall standing between the monarch and the people, hiding from the monarch the true condition of the people for the sake of selfish advantages," [6] and one of the rebel officers could get his troops to move only by claiming that Nicholas I was not the "true tsar."

The crushing of the revolt did not end the rumors of a returning deliverer. In 1827 the head of the secret police reported widespread unrest among the peasantry, who "await their liberator, whom they call Metelkin, as the Jews await their Messiah. They

say: 'Pugachev frightened the masters, but Metelkin will sweep them away.' " [7] Millenarian expectations were particularly strong among sectarians and Old Believers. The Skoptsy, who adopted Peter III as their messiah, displayed portraits of the late emperor with dark hair and beard and dressed in a kaftan trimmed with fur—that is, as Pugachev, whose return, they said, would be heralded by the bells of the Uspensky Cathedral in Moscow.

The passage of time did little to erode the Pugachev legend. Throughout the nineteenth century Pugachev, in the eyes of the faithful, remained the "resplendent sun," a flaming symbol of revolt which having set must rise again. To this familiar image Pushkin, in his history of the rebellion, added the figure of a soaring bird which symbolized the coming revolution. According to Pushkin's account, the following dialogue took place between Pugachev and General Panin after the pretender's capture:

> PANIN: "Exactly who are you?"
> PUGACHEV: "Emelian Ivanovich Pugachev."
> PANIN: "Then how dare you, a brigand [*vor*], call yourself the Sovereign?"
> PUGACHEV: "I am not the raven [*voron*] but his offspring. The raven himself is still flying." [8]

That Pugachev had in fact uttered these words is doubtful. What Pushkin recorded, rather, was one of the legends he had unearthed during his research on the uprising. But the story, as we shall see, caught on and would be repeated many times in the future, especially by revolutionary populists trying to inspire the peasants with Pugachev's example.

The authorities, meanwhile, used every means of repression to prevent a new upheaval. Nicholas I himself admitted that serfdom was "a palpable evil," but to touch it, he said, would only stir up the peasants, and "the Pugachev rebellion proved how far popular rage can go." [9] Reform was thus postponed until the Crimean War, which saw a rising number of peasant outbreaks, centering as before along the middle Volga. Rumor once again played an important role in the disturbances. Some said that an emancipation edict had been drafted by the tsar but suppressed by the nobility, others that peasants who volunteered for the army would be given their freedom. As a result, whole villages were set in

motion to secure their birthright. The south, as before, continued to beckon, where "the leaves never fall from the trees and all men live in joy and righteousness," to quote Turgenev's *Sportsman's Sketches*, a work which helped awaken society to the need for reform. In a similar vein, a group of religious dissenters, the Brothers of Zion, were convinced that a savior would come to lead them to a millennial kingdom in Israel, where "all sorts of blessings are to be heaped like mountains on us—woods, green fields, gardens, honeycomb and fruit, gold, bronze, silver, gems. There will be no barbaric studies, no schools for recruits, no violence, no tricks, no reports, no flattery of the authorities. All will be equal and of one rank, no police, no judges, everywhere sanctity and common people." [10]

With the death of Nicholas I in 1855 fresh rumors of liberation swept the countryside. His successor, it was said, was sitting in the Crimea "with a golden cap," granting land and freedom to all who approached him. For the nobility, however, the tsar's death was a moment of apprehension and suspense. Peter Kropotkin, the future anarchist leader, noted a "real terror" among his aristocratic relatives, who, like their fellow landlords, dreaded "a new uprising of Pugachev." [11] In radical circles, by contrast, the prospect of mass rebellion was a source of hope, in spite of the death and destruction it would inevitably entail. "If the liberation of the peasants cannot be achieved in any other way," wrote Alexander Herzen, "then even that would not be too great a price. Terrible crimes bring with them terrible consequences." Pugachev, he added echoing Pushkin, was "only a small crow. The real one is still flying high in the sky." [12]

The authorities, however, remained alert for signs of a general rising. More than any constitutionalist demands or Jacobin conspiracy, it was the nightmare of a spontaneous revolt that filled them with alarm. "We are not afraid of Mirabeau," declared a government spokesman, "but we are frightened by Emelka Pugachev. Ledru-Rollin and his Communists will find no sympathizers here, but any village will goggle at Nikita Pustosviat. No one will side with Mazzini, but Stenka Razin has only to say the word. That is where our revolution is lurking, that is where our danger lies." The peasants continued to set their hopes on a good tsar, "a simple mortal, a man of the soil who understands the life

of the people and is chosen by the people," as a revolutionary leaflet put it in 1861. "Admittedly," wrote Yuri Samarin the same year, "an image of the remote tsar floats before their eyes, but it is not of the tsar who lives in St. Petersburg, who appoints governors, issues decrees, and moves armies; it is a wholly different, primeval, half-mythical tsar who might rise suddenly from nowhere in the shape of a drunken deacon or a peasant soldier on permanent leave." [13]

As in Pugachev's time, most serfs still thought of liberation as conversion to state peasants, but by the 1850s the new idea of total freedom was beginning to emerge. Witness the following conversation recorded by the secret police:

> FIRST PEASANT: "They say that we will soon be free."
> SECOND PEASANT: "Probably like the state peasants."
> FIRST PEASANT: "No, that's just it—completely free. They won't demand either recruits or taxes and there won't be any kind of authorities. We will run things ourselves." [14]

Among the nobility, meanwhile, both the supporters and the opponents of emancipation evoked the specter of Pugachev to strengthen their case. Some saw the handwriting on the wall and called for immediate reform to forestall a new uprising. Alexander II himself, in a famous speech of 1856, declared that "it is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until the peasants begin to liberate themselves spontaneously from below." Others, on the contrary, fearing that emancipation might unleash rather than avert a general outbreak, warned that the day serfdom was abolished "the peasants would begin to kill the landlords wholesale, and Russia would witness a new Pugachev uprising, far more terrible than that of 1773." [15]

When the emancipation was granted in February 1861, a new *Pugachevshchina* failed to materialize. But sporadic outbreaks occurred over a wide area. Profoundly disillusioned, the serfs refused to believe that so much land would be retained by the nobility, still less that they must pay for their own allotments and meantime remain obligated to their masters and the state. At once it was whispered that the real emancipation, providing a total distribution of the land as well as the cancellation of all payments, had been suppressed by the gentry, or that a second manifesto ("in

letters of gold") would grant them the genuine freedom they desired. Scattered risings broke out in the rural districts, especially along the Volga, where they threatened to assume the proportions of a general upheaval. During 1861 alone more than 500 outbreaks occurred in which troops had to be used. But without the Cossacks to lead them, and without a simultaneous war to divert the attention of the government, they were destined to remain fragmented and localized and were put down with little difficulty.

The most serious incident, however, vividly evoked the risings of the past. Erupting at the village of Bezdna in Kazan province, the heart of Pugachev country, it was led by an Old Believer named Anton Petrov, who declared the emancipation a forgery and advised his fellow villagers to stop working for the gentry, paying their dues, and obeying the authorities. Before long peasants from the surrounding area flocked to hear him say that they were free, that the land was theirs, and that they should remove the officials and elect their own elders. The villagers ceased carrying out their obligations and seized the landlords' fields and forests. The disturbances quickly spread to the adjoining provinces of Simbirsk and Samara, where memories of Razin and Pugachev were still alive. Troops were called to the scene and opened fire, killing or wounding several hundred, when the peasants refused to surrender their leader. After the first volley the peasants stood their ground, shouting "Freedom, freedom! We obey only God and the tsar. You are shooting at the tsar." In the end, however, Petrov was arrested and shot in the presence of his fellow villagers, who were forced to attend the execution. Like Razin and Pugachev, he came to be regarded as a Christ-like martyr who had sacrificed his life to save the poor. After his death, it was said, a fire sprang up on his tomb and an angel in white appeared and announced his imminent resurrection. For years to come the gentry of the area compared him to Pugachev and dreaded a repetition of his rising.[16]

"The present situation," noted a former Decembrist after the Bezdna massacre, "shows that Pugachev is a greater danger to the government than a Pestel or Ryleev." But a greater danger still was an alliance of the radical intelligentsia with the spontaneous rebellion of the dispossessed. Joseph de Maistre understood this when he forecast a new upheaval led by "some uni-

versity Pugachev." Similarly, the historian Shchapov foresaw a time when "Pugachev, mover of the popular masses, will extend his hand to Muraviev, Pestel, or Petrashevsky, when the mournful sounds and thoughts of popular ballad will mingle with the thoughts of Ryleev." [17]

The first serious attempt to forge such an alliance was made by the revolutionary populists, who emerged in the aftermath of the emancipation. Nikolai Chernyshevsky, a founding father of their movement, believed that only through a new *Pugachevshchina*, led this time by the revolutionary intelligentsia, could socialism be achieved in Russia. In 1862 P. G. Zaichnevsky, a student at Moscow University, called for a "bloody and pitiless" revolt modeled on the risings of the past. The following year a group of students in Kazan, a traditional center of peasant rebellion, tried to incite a new uprising "to repeat the one led by Pugachev." In 1870, the bicentennial of Razin's rebellion, Sergei Nechaev predicted that before long popular fury would again "burst like a storm on the nobility, which wallows in vice and luxury." And in 1873 Peter Lavrov hailed the centennial of Pugachev as the signal for a new upheaval more powerful than those of the past. "*You* celebrate the memory of Catherine," he declared to the Russian nobility. "*You* celebrate the memory of Bibikov. *We*, however, honor Pugachev." Pugachev, he added, repeating Pushkin's legend, was only a small raven, but the raven of today will shape the "future destiny of the Russian people." [18]

When the populists went "to the people" in the 1870s, they consciously linked their efforts to the anniversaries of Razin and Pugachev. Some deliberately used the seventeenth-century term *shaika* (gang of brigands) to describe their clandestine circles, and called for the seizure of gentry land as well as the removal of local officials and the election of *atamans* and elders in their place. "Such was the invariable 'program' of the popular revolutionary socialists, Pugachev, Razin, and their associates," ran one of their leaflets, "and such it doubtless remains for the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. Therefore we revolutionary populists accept it." [19] Nor was it accidental that they should concentrate their efforts in the regions of the great jacqueries of the past or, mindful of their role in the earlier risings, seek to attract the Old Believers to their cause. "We believe that the greatest

revolutionary traditions are preserved among the people of the Volga, Don, and Dnieper," said one populist militant, "for the largest popular movements originated in these borderlands. Pugachev's revolt was on the Volga, Razin's on the Don . . . and so we have decided not to scatter our forces over the whole of Russia but to concentrate them in these areas." Similarly, Kropotkin, who helped draft a popular history of the *Pugachevshchina* for propaganda purposes, urged his comrades of the Chaikovsky circle to "choose some district where memories of Razin and Pugachev are still alive, and move towards Moscow, on the way stirring up the peasants against the gentry and local authorities." [20]

The most successful populist venture in the countryside, at the southern village of Chigirin in 1877, revived the myth of the good tsar deceived by the wicked aristocracy. The agitators brought a manifesto with a large gold seal in which the tsar gave the peasants all the land without payment, "like the light of the sun and all God's other gifts." This old device of Pugachev, repeated by Anton Petrov, proved once again effective. The Chigirin villagers elected their own *ataman* and elders and were about to evict the landlords and officials when the authorities, learning of their plans from a drunken peasant, stepped in and crushed the rising.

The Chigirin episode was engineered by followers of Michael Bakunin, the famous Russian anarchist, who has aptly been described as "a Stenka Razin of the Russian gentry." [21] Of all the revolutionary leaders none drew more inspiration from the spontaneous upheavals of the past. For Bakunin, indeed, the revolts of Razin and Pugachev were prototypes of the coming social revolution, "not the first peasant revolutions in Russia, and not the last." Razin and Pugachev, he said, were model rebels, indomitable, indefatigable, and outside the pale of law, courageous popular avengers and irreconcilable enemies of the state. "We must ally ourselves with the doughty world of the brigands, who are the only real revolutionaries," he wrote with Nechaev in 1869. "The anniversaries of Stenka Razin and Pugachev are approaching. Let us prepare for the feast." [22]

Bakunin placed his faith not only in brigands but in all uprooted segments of society. Inspired by Razin and Pugachev, he saw the salvation of mankind in the destructive yet creative

turbulence of the dispossessed. His, like theirs, was an apocalyptic vision, a dream of immediate and universal rebellion, of the leveling of all existing values and institutions and the creation of a free society on their ashes. He envisioned, moreover, a revolt of the backlands against the center, of the primitive against the advanced regions of the empire, indeed, of Europe as a whole, an all-embracing upheaval in both town and country, including the darkest elements of society—the landless peasants, the *Lumpenproletariat*, the unemployed—pitted against their wealthy and privileged oppressors. He called for an alliance of the déclassé intellectuals with the urban and rural poor into "a single calculated and ruthless popular revolution" to bring about a "new and genuine liberty which will no longer come from above but from below."

Against this must be set the view of the Russian Marxists, who began to emerge as a movement during the 1880s. Inheriting their mentor's scorn for the "idiocy of rural life," they saw the rural population as backward and superstitious and, though prone to sporadic rioting, incapable of posing a real threat to the existing order. Even when aroused, they thought, the peasantry would only dissipate their strength in wild and undisciplined violence. Their defeat was inevitable, moreover, since their backward-looking aspirations were incompatible with the emerging industrial system. For all their popular heroism, the peasant revolts represented nihilistic outbursts against the ineluctable process of modernization, desperate but futile protests against the unfamiliar forces that threatened on every side. In their quest for a pastoral utopia, according to this view, Razin and Pugachev were seeking to turn back the clock, to re-create a decentralized, agrarian, and economically stagnant society, a moribund primitive world which history had doomed to oblivion. Razin, wrote Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, aimed to "replace the new order with the old," and Pugachev "looked backward into the dark recesses of bygone years." [23]

Not that the Marxists were completely blind to the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. Indeed Marx himself, for all his reservations about the rural folk, once wrote of the necessity to back "the proletarian revolution by some second edition of the Peasants' War." This remark, in turn, made a deep impression on

Lenin, who, echoing Marx's words, was to call the Russian Revolution the "union of a 'peasant war' with the working class movement." [24] Lenin was fully alive to the revolutionary implications of the peasantry's desire for land. He understood, moreover, that given Russia's backwardness a tactical alliance between the proletariat and peasantry was necessary for a successful revolution. His greatest achievement, in fact, was to return to the anarcho-populist roots of the Russian revolutionary tradition, to adapt his Marxist theories to suit the conditions of an underdeveloped country in which a proletarian revolution alone made little sense. As Zinoviev remarked in 1924, "the joining of the workers' revolution with the peasant war is the most basic feature of Leninism, Vladimir Ilyich's most important discovery." Trotsky put it in a similar way in his history of the revolution: "In order to realize the Soviet state, there was required a drawing together of two factors belonging to completely different historic species: a peasant war—that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois development—and a proletarian insurrection, the movement signalizing its decline. That is the essence of 1917." [25]

But this was hardly Lenin's "discovery," nor even Marx's. For Marx, on the contrary, the socialist revolution required the emergence of a well-organized and class-conscious proletariat, something to be expected in highly industrialized countries like Germany or England. It was Bakunin, rather, who saw that modern revolutions, like the Russian rebellions of the past, would emerge from the lower depths of society, and he therefore pinned his hopes on a peasant jacquerie and a simultaneous rising of the infuriated urban mobs, "solid and barbarian elements" which, having been the least exposed to the corrupting influences of bourgeois civilization, retained their primitive vigor and instincts for revolt. The real proletariat, he said, consisted of the great mass of "uncivilized, disinherited, and illiterate millions" who truly had nothing to lose. And his prophecy was fulfilled. For the three greatest revolutions of the twentieth century—in Russia, in Spain, and in China—have all occurred in relatively backward countries and have largely been "peasant wars" linked with outbreaks of the urban poor and a militant elite of déclassé intellectuals who, in Russia at least, replaced the Cossacks and schismatics of the past.

To what extent, then, did the revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries foreshadow the revolutions of 1905 and 1917? Clearly they had a deep influence on revolutionary thought in the nineteenth century and did much to shape the character of the Russian revolutionary movement. Yet 130 years elapsed between Pugachev's rising and the 1905 Revolution, during which profound and irrevocable changes occurred in the nature of Russian society. In particular, Russia saw the emergence of a labor movement and a radical intelligentsia, and new ideas and aspirations began to capture the popular imagination, replacing, at least in part, old beliefs and traditions. The beginnings of industrialization, moreover, created new pressures that helped to undermine the tsarist order, which in the days of Pugachev had been at the height of its strength. By the end of the nineteenth century, when the last of the Romanovs ascended the throne, the autocracy was a mere shadow of its former self, supported by a declining nobility and unable to withstand the mounting pressures from below. In its weakened condition, moreover, the old regime suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of external enemies. The Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, unlike those of the eighteenth century, went badly from the start, shattering the prestige of the ruling elite, undermining the discipline of the armed forces, and opening the way for the government's overthrow, which earlier rebellions had been unable to accomplish.

In their historical setting, then, the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 differed markedly from those of the past. More than that, they gathered around no dramatic personal symbols of leadership, they flared up in the heartland as well as the peripheries, and they led to political and economic changes that were far more sweeping than those which had followed the earlier upheavals. Yet the similarities are even more striking than the differences. For Russia remained a backward country with an antiquated social structure, so that old forms of rebellion persisted alongside the new. Like the risings of the past, the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 were explosions of mass discontent—elemental, unpremeditated, and unorganized—in which diverse social and national groups pursued disparate and often conflicting objectives. Triggered by unpopular wars, with their burdens of taxation and recruitment, the lower

orders exhibited the same fierce hostility toward privilege and authority, the same destructive fury, compounded of envy, hatred, and mistrust, which they had previously directed against the wealthy and powerful. Furthermore, many of the same social elements—peasants, artisans, national minorities—were involved, including even the Cossacks (at least the poorer or "naked" segment), who reverted to their former insurrectionary role and sided with the people against the government. In February 1917, indeed, it was the Cossacks who, by refusing to fire on the Petrograd crowds, sealed the fate of the autocracy. The modern revolutions, moreover, were sectional as well as social conflicts, with the peripheries rising against the center as in the past, though for the first time the risings in the outlying rural districts coincided with outbreaks in Petrograd and Moscow, as well as other cities of the industrial heartland, and brought about the collapse of the autocracy.

The revolutions of 1905 and 1917 saw the same ideological simplicity, the same lack of a well-defined program, as before. For the peasants and for many workers the prototype of the new society remained a decentralized pastoral paradise in which they might live in peace and contentment with full economic and political freedom organized from below. Fired by simple slogans, the laboring classes aimed at a direct plebeian democracy through local councils and communes akin to the Cossack *krugs* of the past. Their frame of mind, moreover, remained passionately apocalyptic. They showed the same millennial drive, the same yearning for redemption, for a drastic renovation of society, as before. Many Russian peasants, as a contemporary observed, hailed the 1917 Revolution as "the direct realization of their religious hopes." [26] One finds the same faith in regeneration through destruction, which had made so strong an impression on Bakunin. One finds, too, the same popular legends which had been so conspicuous in earlier upheavals. The myth of the good tsar, for instance, was still widely accepted among artisans and peasants. During the rural outbreaks of 1905 and 1917, the villagers often claimed to be acting in the name of a popular ruler who had authorized the distribution of the gentry estates. "It was not so much the Emperor as the regime of which the nation as a whole was weary," noted the British ambassador in 1917. "As a soldier

remarked, 'Oh yes, we must have a Republic, but we must have a good tsar at the head.' " [27]

Oral tradition, of course, played a key role in perpetuating these legends. When the writer Korolenko, following in Pushkin's footsteps, went to the Volga and Urals at the turn of the century to collect materials about Pugachev, he found the myth of "Peter Fyodorovich" still flourishing. What was more, following the great famine of 1891, pretenders again appeared in the byways of rural Russia, one of whom (typically, a former soldier) was said to bear the "marks of the tsar" on his chest, like Pugachev. About the same time, moreover, though over a century had passed since Pugachev's rebellion, a Bashkir was arrested in the Urals for singing a song about Salavat Yulaev at a village celebration. And in the mines and foundries of the Urals during the 1905 Revolution it was said that if a new *ataman* should appear he would find "hundreds or even thousands ready to follow him." [28]

Nor was this danger lost on the authorities, who often compared the rioting of 1905 and 1917 to that of Razin and Pugachev. In 1905, for instance, Prime Minister Witte raised the specter of Pugachev to persuade the tsar to sign the October Manifesto, lest "a Russian revolt, senseless and merciless, should sweep all before it and turn everything to dust." Using the same phrase from Pushkin, the head of the Kadet party, Pavel Miliukov, warned on the eve of 1917 that unless reforms were granted rebellion would engulf the whole country. "And God save us from this fire. It would not be a revolution. It would be that terrible 'Russian revolt, senseless and merciless' . . . an orgy of the mob." [29] But the Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, saw things in a different light. If reforms were in fact introduced, he said, as the Kadets demanded, they would undermine the whole social order, claiming the Kadets themselves among the victims, "and afterwards would come the revolutionary mob, the Commune, the destruction of the dynasty, pogroms of the possessing classes, and finally the peasant-brigand." As Trotsky commented: "It is impossible to deny that the police anger here rises to a certain kind of historic vision." [30]

Clearly, then, the Russian revolutions of the twentieth century were deeply rooted in the risings of the past. Traditional forms

and patterns, rather than vanishing, either persisted or were transformed and adapted to new conditions. Moreover, the urban and rural poor continued to play a key revolutionary role, furnishing the explosive that demolished the old order. But the makers of the revolution were to become its chief victims, crushed by the new regime which they helped into power. For the Bolsheviks proceeded to erect a new centralized order that was stronger than the one that it replaced. After a brief interval of freedom, a new bureaucracy resumed the revolution from above begun under the tsars, harnessing a reluctant population to the needs of the state. For Bolshevism, as for tsarism, autonomy and spontaneity were evil words, evoking the stormy, ungovernable passions of the lower classes, which the governing elite was anxious to control. According to Marxist theory, the peasant had to be broken if the revolution was to be "progressive." Thus the Bolsheviks turned on the very groups which had brought them to power, putting an end to their rural and handicrafts world and making them, in Barrington Moore's words, the main "victims of the socialist version of primary capitalist accumulation." [31]

The result was a resumption of civil war between the state and the people. As early as 1918 a peasant congress declared that the organs of local self-government must defend themselves once more against the usurpations of the center. There was no end to it—tsars, landlords, bureaucrats, and now Bolsheviks—"all have scoffed and mocked at us." [32] Among the political parties the anarchists and Socialist Revolutionaries defended the popular revolution against the new autocracy, opposing the "Communists and commissars" as Razin and Pugachev had opposed the "boyars and officials." In this sense the anarchist Makhno, the ex–Socialist Revolutionary Antonov, and the sailors of Kronstadt were the final echoes of the earlier mass protests against centralized bureaucratic despotism.

As in the past, the government's opponents were concentrated in the peripheries, particularly in the Urals and along the Don and Volga. For the Socialist Revolutionaries the nerve center was the middle Volga, for Makhno the lower Dnieper. Among the Don Cossacks, interestingly enough, the old slogan that "fugitives are not handed over" was revived against the new Muscovite

government. In the eyes of the peasantry, moreover, the state remained a predator, while Makhno and Antonov were new Razins or Pugachevs come to rescue them from oppression and to grant them land and freedom. Makhno, wrote a fellow anarchist, "became the avenging angel of the lowly, and presently he was looked upon as the great liberator whose coming had been prophesied by Pugachev in his dying moments," [33] a reference to the "raven" legend from Pushkin. Following the example of his precursors, Makhno expropriated the gentry, removed the officials, established a Cossack-style "republic" in the steppe, and was revered by his followers as their *batko*. The government, for its part, denounced him and Antonov as "bandits"—the epithet with which Moscow had maligned its guerrilla opponents since the seventeenth century—and used draconian measures to suppress them. Antonov, by an odd coincidence, met the same fate as Bulavin, being shot while fleeing from a house that his pursuers had set ablaze. What is more, the same legends arose about them after their defeat. As Makhno's wife told Emma Goldman, "there grew up among the country folk the belief that Makhno was invincible because he had never been wounded during all the years of warfare in spite of his practice of always personally leading every charge." [34]

The myth of the good tsar was also long in dying. Accordingly, the peasants tended to blame not Lenin himself for their suffering, but rather his corrupt and scheming advisors, who kept the ruler in ignorance while robbing the people of their freedom. The rebels of Kronstadt, while denouncing Trotsky and Zinoviev for their treachery, treated Lenin with a certain respect and distinguished him sharply from his associates. The Bolshevik leader, they said, was actually fed up with government affairs and wanted only to escape. "But Lenin's cohorts would not let him flee. He is their prisoner and must utter slanders just as they do." [35] Thus as late as 1921 the ancient legend of the benevolent tsar as a helpless captive of his underlings had lost none of its vitality. But even that was not all. When Lenin died in 1924 it was rumored that he was still alive, awaiting the proper moment to rescue the people from their new masters. Lenin, according to one legend, had sent for his doctor a year or two before and asked if he could make him appear dead. "I want to see what becomes of

Russia if they think me dead," he explained. "At present they put everything on my shoulders and make me responsible." Only the doctor and Lenin's wife knew the secret. Lenin's death was announced, everyone mourned, and he was put in a mausoleum in Red Square. But at night he walks about in the Kremlin, in the factories, in the villages. "No one knows how long Lenin will lie in his glass case pretending to be dead." [36]

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. V. V. Mavrodin *et al.*, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii v 1773–1775 godakh*, 3 vols., Leningrad, 1961–1970, I, 41.
2. See Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, 2nd edn., Princeton, N.J., 1958, pp. 152–53.
3. Quoted in Mavrodin, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii*, I, 55.
4. V. O. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, 5 vols., New York, 1911–1931, III, 46.
5. N. N. Firsov, *Razinovshchina*, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 3.
6. Mavrodin, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii*, I, 180.
7. A. L. Shapiro, "Ob istoricheskoi roli krest'ianskikh voin XVII–XVIII vv. v Rossii," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1965, No. 5, p. 63.
8. Eric Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, Manchester, England, 1959, p. 2.

CHAPTER 1: BOLOTNIKOV, 1606–1607

1. *Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century*, ed. Sir Edward Bond, London, 1856, p. 206.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
3. Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Common Wealth*, London, 1591, p. 26.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
5. V. I. Koretskii, "Iz istorii krest'ianskoi voiny v Rossii nachala XVII veka," *Voprosy Istorii*, 1959, No. 3, pp. 119–22.
6. Kliuchevsky, *A History of Russia*, II, 89.
7. See Iu. V. Got'e, *Zamoskovnyi krai v XVII veke*, Moscow, 1937, pp. 138–48.
8. Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, New Haven, Conn., 1961, pp. 42–44.
9. Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 50–51.
10. I. I. Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova, 1606–1607*, 2nd. edn., Moscow, 1951, p. 63.
11. P. I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, p. 198.
12. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, XIV, part 1, St. Petersburg, 1910, 58, hereafter cited as *PSRL; Skazanie Avraamiia Palitsyna*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 107–8.

13. See *Voprosy Istorii*, 1958, No. 3, pp. 97–113; 1960, No. 6, pp. 90–101; and *Istoriia SSSR*, 1962, No. 4, pp. 112–18.

14. George Vernadsky, "The Death of the Tsarevich Dimitry: A Reconsideration of the Case," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, V, 1954, 1–19.

15. Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 24. See also A. H. Thompson, "The Legend of Tsarevich Dimitriy: Some Evidence of an Oral Tradition," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XLVI, January 1968, 45–59.

16. V. N. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni na Rusi XVII v.," *Starina i Novizna*, XIV, 1911, 262.

17. Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 32; Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 254. For an absorbing account of Dmitri's meteoric career, see Philip L. Barbour, *Dimitry, Called the Pretender*, Boston, 1966.

18. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, New Haven, Conn., 1961, p. 117.

19. A. Hirschberg, ed., *Polska a Moskwa w perwszej polowie wieku XVII*, Lwow, 1901, p. 75.

20. *Akty, sobrannye v bibliotekakh i arkhivakh Rossiiskoi imperii Arkheograficheskoiu ekspeditsieiu Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, 4 vols., St. Petersburg, 1836, II, 111–12, hereafter *AAE; PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 70; *Rerum rossicarum scriptores exteri*, II, St. Petersburg, 1868, 110–11.

21. "Yaroslav's daughter early weeps / in Putivl on the rampart." *The Song of Igor's Campaign*, tr. Vladimir Nabokov, New York, 1960, pp. 64–65.

22. N. G. Ustrialov, ed., *Skazaniia sovremennikov o Dimitrii Samozvantse*, 3rd edn., 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1859, I, 79.

23. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova: dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow, 1959, p. 373; *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 70.

24. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 262. The author of this anonymous English report, which constitutes one of the most valuable sources on Bolotnikov's revolt, was in all probability John Merick (or Meyrick), a successor of Jerome Horsey, who spent many years in Moscow as chief agent of the Russia Company. In the words of an associate, he acquitted his duties "with wonderful judgment and discretion, with such credit with the Emperor [Boris] as never any Englishman had the like, both for honest pleasing of him and provident care of his own country's profit." Knighted by James I, Merick returned to Russia in 1615 as ambassador to the court of Tsar Michael. *Dictionary of National Biography*, XIII, 319–20; T. S. Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company 1553–1603*, Manchester, England, 1956, p. 240; *Russia at the Close of the Sixteenth Century*, p. 265n; *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, XIII, 1942, 291–302.

25. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 263.

26. Fletcher, *Of the Russe Common Wealth*, p. 67.

27. *Rerum rossicarum scriptores exteri*, I, 1851, 70; II, 107–8, 119, 154; *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, pp. 186–87.

28. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 71.

29. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 71.

30. N. I. Kostomarov, *Smutnoe vremia Moskovskogo gosudarstva v nachale XVII stoletiia*, 3 vols. in 1, St. Petersburg, 1868, II, 50; S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 15 vols., Moscow, 1959–1966, IV, 468; *Rerum rossicarum*, II, 106.

31. S. A. Belokurov, ed., *Razriadnye zapisi za Smutnoe vremia (7113–7121 gg.)*, Moscow, 1907, p. 156.

32. Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, pp. 194–200; *Rerum rossicarum*, II, 116; S. F. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.*, St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 327–29.

33. P. P. Smirnov, *Goroda Moskovskogo gosudarstva v pervoi polovine XVII veke*, 2 vols., Kiev, 1917–1919, I, part 1, 16–59.

34. According to the late Professor Smirnov, the leading authority on Bolotnikov, no less than 20,000 runaway slaves thronged the southern border towns. Some of them (including Bolotnikov himself) had been military servitors in their masters' private retinues and thus were of particular importance in the motley rebel army. *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, pp. 107–9. See also V. I. Koretskii, "Letopisets s novymi izvestiiami o vosstanii Bolotnikova," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1968, No. 4, pp. 120–30.

35. "Piskarevskii letopisets," *Materialy po istorii SSSR*, II, 1955, 131.

36. *AAE*, II, 132.

37. Kostomarov, *Smutnoe vremia*, II, 44; Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, p. 70. Pashkov's role at Elets, however, has been questioned by other specialists. See *Voprosy Istorii*, 1958, No. 3, pp. 97–113; and 1959, No. 7, pp. 72–75.

38. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty*, p. 334.

39. *AAE*, II, 137.

40. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 175.

41. Belokurov, *Razriadnye zapisi*, p. 10.

42. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 71.

43. Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 32.

44. Hirschberg, *Polska a Moskwa*, p. 81; *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 177.

45. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, IV, 470.

46. M. N. Tikhomirov, "Novyi istochnik po istorii vosstaniia Bolotnikova," *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, VI, 1951, 116.

47. *AAE*, II, 129. Compare Merick's account: "They continued the siege and writ letters to the slaves within the town, to take arms against their masters and possess themselves of their goods and substance. . . ." Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 262.

48. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 184; Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, pp. 289–91.

49. *AAE*, II, 131.

50. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 71. Cf. Ustrialov, *Skazaniia souvremennikov*, I, 83.

51. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, pp. 175–77.

52. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 263.

53. Platonov, *Ocherki po istorii smuty*, pp. 334–35.

54. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 262.
55. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 72; *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, I, 1936, 6–7, VIII, 1953, 32, 70.
56. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 73; *AAE*, II, 138.
57. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 71.
58. Aleksandrenko, "Materialy po Smutnomu vremeni," p. 263.
59. Notably Yushka Bezzubtsev, a Cossack officer from Putivl, who previously had fought for Dmitri the Pretender and now, apparently, stood by Bolotnikov to the end. G. N. Anpilogov, "Novye materialy o krest'ianskoi voine pod rukovodstvom I. Bolotnikova," *Voprosy Istorii*, 1966, No. 12, pp. 199–202. Kostomarov and Platonov, however, say that Bezzubtsev defected on December 2, 1606.
60. *Rerum rossicarum*, II, 113.
61. Hirschberg, *Polska a Moskwa*, p. 86.
62. Smirnov, *Vosstanie Bolotnikova*, pp. 201–7.
63. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, IV, 472; *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 72.
64. L. M. Sukhotin, ed., *Chetvertchiki Smutnogo vremeni (1604–1617)*, Moscow, 1912, pp. 202–38; *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, pp. 263–72.
65. "Piskarevskii letopisets," p. 125.
66. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 74.
67. A. N. Popov, *Izbornik slavianskikh i russkikh sochinenii i statei*, Moscow, 1869, p. 332.
68. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, pp. 109–10, 223–26; *Skazanie Avraamiia Palitsyna*, p. 116; Belokurov, *Razriadnye zapisi*, p. 10; *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 71.
69. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 74. Cf. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 110.
70. "Smutnoe vremia Moskovskogo gosudarstva," ed. A. M. Gnevushev, *Chteniia*, 1915, II, p. 262.
71. *PSRL*, XIV, part 1, 74; *Rerum rossicarum*, II, 115–16.
72. Kostomarov, *Smutnoe vremia*, II, 41–42; Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, IV, 466.
73. *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, pp. 117, 178–79.
74. *AAE*, II, 164.
75. *Rerum rossicarum*, II, 155.
76. *Ibid.*, I, 76; *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 118.
77. Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 37.
78. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 73; II, 156.
79. "Smutnoe vremia," *Chteniia*, 1915, book 2, pp. 171–72.
80. *Rerun rossicarum*, I, 79; II, 156–57.
81. Hirschberg, *Polska a Moskwa*, p. 128.
82. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, IV, 703–4.
83. *Rerum rossicarum*, I, 80; *Vosstanie I. Bolotnikova*, p. 348.

CHAPTER II: RAZIN, 1670-1671

1. See J. L. H. Keep, "Bandits and the Law in Muscovy," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXV, December 1956, 201–22; and Denise Eeckaute, "Les brigands en Russie du XVIIe siècle," *Revue D'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, XII, July–September 1965, 161–202.
2. N. I. Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, in his *Istoricheskie monografii i issledovaniia*, 2nd edn., St. Petersburg, 1872, II, 204.
3. Iu. M. Sokolov, *Russian Folklore*, New York, 1950, p. 264.
4. "Nechem platit' dolgu—stupai na Volgu, libo v razboiniki, libo v burlaki," in I. V. Stepanov, *Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom S. T. Razina (1670–1671 gg.)*, Moscow, 1957, p. 24.
5. T. I. Smirnova, "Pobegi krest'ian nakanune vystupleniia S. Razina," *Voprosy Istorii*, 1956, No. 6, pp. 129–30.
6. I. V. Stepanov, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii v 1670–1671 gg.: vosstanie Stepana Razina*, Leningrad, 1966, I, 256. See also A. G. Man'kov, *Razvitie krepostnogo prava v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 22ff.
7. See, for instance, R. B. Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions*, Oxford, 1938; Trevor Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660*, New York, 1965; and Robert Forster and J. P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, Baltimore, 1971.
8. Aston, *Crisis in Europe*, p. 59; S. F. Platonov, *Lektsii po russkoi istorii*, 7th edn., St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 339; S. P. Mel'gunov, *Religiozno-obshchestvennye dvizheniia XVI–XVIII vv. v Rossii*, Moscow, 1922, p. 44.
9. See Michael Cherniavsky, "The Old Believers and the New Religion," *Slavic Review*, XXV, March 1966, 1–39.
10. Platonov, *Lektsii*, p. 344; Kliuchevsky, *History*, III, 136.
11. Leo Loewenson, "The Moscow Rising of 1648," *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXVII, December 1948, 153. See also S. B. Bakhrushin, "Moskovskii miatezh 1648 g.," in *Sbornik statei v chesti prof. M. K. Liubavskogo*, Petrograd, 1917, pp. 709–74.
12. George V. Lantzeff, *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century*, Berkeley, Calif., 1943, p. 85; Platonov, *Lektsii*, p. 344.
13. G. K. Kotoshikhin, *O Rossii v tsarstvovanii Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, 3rd edn., St. Petersburg, 1884, pp. 114–18.
14. Quoted in I. I. Smirnov *et al.*, *Krest'ianskie voiny v Rossii XVII–XVIII vv.*, Moscow, 1966, p. 209.
15. Lists of *zhalovanie* supplied by Moscow to the Don Cossacks from 1651 to 1692 are to be found in V. G. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu v kontse XVII veka*, St. Petersburg, 1889, pp. 229–32.
16. N. N. Firsov, *Krest'ianskaia revoliutsiia na Rusi v XVII veke*, Moscow, 1927, pp. 74–75.
17. Druzhinin, *Raskol na Donu*, p. 43.

18. *Donskie dela*, 5 vols., St. Petersburg, 1898–1917, V, 709–13, 765–66.
19. Adam Olearius, *Voyages and Travels*, 2nd edn., London, 1669, p. 112; A. I. Rigel'man, *Istoriia ili povestvovanie o donskikh kazakakh*, Moscow, 1846, VII, part 2, 11.
20. *Akty istoricheskie*, 5 vols., St. Petersburg, 1841–1842, IV, 374.
21. E. V. Chistiakova, *Vasilii Us—spodvizhnik Stepana Razina*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 12–40.
22. *Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina: sbornik dokumentov*, 3 vols. in 4, Moscow, 1954–1962, I, 70.
23. *Donskie dela*, IV, 551–52; V, 846, 922–25; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 28–30, 261. There is evidence, however, that Razin did not make the second trip to Solovki, for in February 1662 he was already back in Astrakhan on another mission to the Kalmyks.
24. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 30–31; V. I. Lebedev, *Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina, 1667–1671 gg.*, Moscow, 1955, p. 46.
25. For example, Jan Struys, *The Voyages and Travels of John Struys*, London, 1684, p. 184; and *A Relation Concerning the Particulars of the Rebellion Lately Raised in Muscovy by Stenko Razin*, London, 1672, p. 4.
26. See, for instance, *Donskie dela*, IV, 168.
27. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 186.
28. *A Relation*, pp. 4–5.
29. Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, pp. 228–29.
30. *Akty istoricheskie*, IV, 376–77.
31. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 135–36; Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, p. 235.
32. Stepanov, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii*, I, 328.
33. *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*, 234 vols., St. Petersburg, 1830–1916, I, 845; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 134–56. Taking a town by guile is an important motif of Cossack folklore.
34. Jean Chardin, *The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East Indies*, London, 1691, part 2, p. 141.
35. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 184.
36. Chardin, *Travels*, part 2, pp. 144–45; A. N. Popov, *Materialy dlia istorii vozmushcheniia Sten'ki Razina*, Moscow, 1857, p. 31.
37. *A Relation*, p. 6.
38. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, 12 vols., St. Petersburg, 1846–1875, VI, 15.
39. "Anonymous Narrative," in Struys, *Voyages*, p. 362.
40. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 187.
41. Ludwig Fabritius, another contemporary observer, gives a variant of Struys's tale, stating that Razin in 1668 threw a captured Tatar girl into the Yaik. Of the principal authorities on Razin, Kostomarov, Soloviev, and Firsov all accept the existence of the princess, while Tkhorzhevsky—probably correctly—rejects it.
42. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, VI, 161.
43. Firsov, *Razinovshchina*, p. 45.

44. "Anonymous Narrative," in Struys, *Voyages*, p. 362.
45. *A Relation*, p. 6; Popov, *Materialy*, p. 192.
46. Stepanov, *Krest'ianskaia voina v Rossii*, I, 14; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 99–101.
47. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, VI, 57; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, I, 846; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 163–65. Drowning was a traditional Cossack method of execution, the victim being placed in a sack filled with sand and stones, to prevent his body from rising to the surface. A pagan survival, this practice was intended to propitiate the water spirits, on which the Cossacks counted during fishing and maritime expeditions.
48. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 235–36, 253.
49. Quoted in Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, p. 271.
50. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 195–96, 221; *Polnoe sobranie zakonov*, I, 846.
51. A. N. Popov, *Istoriia vozmushcheniia Sten'ki Razina*, Moscow, 1857, pp. 67–69.
52. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 163.
53. Quoted in R. Nesbit Bain, *The First Romanovs (1613–1725)*, London, 1905, pp. 55–57.
54. Popov, *Istoriia*, p. 69; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 183.
55. S. Konovalov, "Ludwig Fabritius's Account of the Razin Rebellion," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, VI, 1955, 81–83; *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, VI, 58. On Fabritius see also *Voprosy Istorii*, 1966, No. 5, pp. 202–6.
56. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 177; Olearius, *Voyages*, pp. 65, 127; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 244.
57. "David Butler's Narrative," in Struys, *Voyages*, p. 368.
58. *A Relation*, p. 8.
59. "David Butler's Narrative," in Struys, *Voyages*, p. 366.
60. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 196.
61. Konovalov, "Ludwig Fabritius's Account," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, VI, 84.
62. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 183.
63. *Ibid.*, I, 250; *AAE*, IV, 228–29.
64. "David Butler's Narrative," in Struys, *Voyages*, p. 373.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 373–78. See also Popov, *Istoriia*, pp. 75–76; and *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*, 5 vols., Moscow, 1813–1894, IV, 253–54.
66. Konovalov, "Ludwig Fabritius's Account," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, VI, 85.
67. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 252.
68. Firsov, *Razinovshchina*, pp. 38–39.
69. S. G. Tomsinskii, ed., *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii i razinshchina*, Moscow, 1931, p. 309; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 65.
70. Popov, *Istoriia*, p. 116.
71. Struys, *Voyages*, p. 192.
72. Stepanov, *Krest'ianskaia voina*, p. 14.

73. S. I. Porfir'ev, "Razinshchina v Kazanskom krae," *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete*, XXIX, 1916, No. 5–6, p. 313.

74. Sokolov, *Russian Folklore*, p. 371. See also *Voprosy Istorii*, 1969, No. 4, pp. 138–47.

75. *A Relation*, p. 14. Cf. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, p. 63; Firsov, *Krest'ianskaia revoliutsiia*, p. 106; V. A. Nikol'skii, *Sten'ka Razin i razinovshchina*, St. Petersburg, n.d., p. 52; and *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, I, 1936, 78.

76. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 79.

77. See, for example, *ibid.*, II, part 1, 141; Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, pp. 289–94; *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, I, 79; and A. A. Geraklitov, *Istoriia Saratovskogo kraia v XVI–XVII vv.*, Saratov, 1923, p 215.

78. Popov, *Istoriia*, p. 81; Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, p. 312.

79. *A Relation*, p. 10.

80. *Ibid.*

81. "Pis'mo Sten'ki Razina k Kazanskim tataram," *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, istorii i etnografii pri Imperatorskom Kazanskom universitete*, VIII, No. 3, 44–45.

82. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, pp. 282–84; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 78–79.

83. B. N. Tikhomirov, *Razinshchina*, Moscow, 1930, p. 105.

84. *A Relation*, pp. 11–12; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, I, 235, 279–80.

85. *A Relation*, p. 12; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 203.

86. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 31, 552; Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, p. 63.

87. See N. A. Barsukov, *Soloveтskoe vosstanie (1668–1676 gg.)*, Petrozavodsk, 1954, pp. 49–50; M. I. Fenomenov, *Razinovshchina i pugachevshchina*, Moscow, 1923, p. 15; and Tikhomirov, *Razinshchina*, p. 106.

88. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly* p. 19.

89. D. F. Karzhavin, *Stepan Razin v Simbirske*, Ulyanovsk, 1947, p. 34.

90. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 69; A. I. Solov'ev, *Sten'ka Razin i ego soobshchniki v predelakh nyneshnei Simbirskoi gubernii*, Simbirsk, 1907, pp. 31–34.

91. *A Relation*, pp. 9–10.

92. Quoted in Lebedev, *Krest'ianskaia voina*, p. 105.

93. B. D. Grekov, *Novye materialy o dvizhenii Stepana Razina*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 208; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 40.

94. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 114; Tikhomirov, *Razinshchina*, pp. 116–17.

95. See, for example, *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 83, 172, 266.

96. See Fenomenov, *Razinovshchina i pugachevshchina*, p. 112n.

97. *Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii*, 15 vols., St. Petersburg, 1863–1892, IX, 266–93; D. E. Kravtsov, "Otgoloski razinshchiny na Ukraine," *Trudy instituta slavianovedeniia Akademii nauk SSSR*, II, 1934, 77–99; K. I. Stetsiuk, *Vpliv povstannia Stepana Razina na Ukraine*, Kiev, 1947, pp. 72–92.

98. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 2, 36, 58–61.

99. See, for instance, *ibid.*, II, part 1, 183–84; part 2, 199–200.

100. I. V. Stepanov, "K istorii krest'ianskoi voiny pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina," *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta (seriia istorii, iazyka i literatury)*, 1961, No. 2, pp. 68–76.

101. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 32.

102. *Ibid.*, II, part 1, 177.

103. A. K. Kabanov, "Razintsy v Nizhegorodskom krae," in *Sbornik statei v chesti M. K. Liubavskogo*, p. 414.

104. *Razgrom razinshchiny*, Leningrad, 1934, p. xiii.

105. Popov, *Istoriia*, p. 100; Solov'ev, *Sten'ka Razin i ego soobshchniki*, pp. 41–42.

106. Popov, *Materialy*, p. 30; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 1, 317.

107. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, p. 309; *Krest'ianskaia voina*, II, part 2, 74–75.

108. *A Relation*, p. 15.

109. *Razgrom razinshchiny*, p. 281; N. S. Chaev, "K istorii razinovshchiny," *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1933, No. 4, pp. 32–37.

110. *A Relation*, p. 13.

111. A. A. Golubev, ed., "K istorii bunta Sten'ki Razina v Zavolzh'i," *Chteniia*, CLXX, part 1, p. 5; Popov, *Materialy*, p. 79.

112. Porfir'ev, "Razinshchina v Kazanskom krae," *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii*, XXIX, No. 5–6, 336–37.

113. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 27–29.

114. *Dopolneniia k aktam istoricheskim*, V, 64, 71.

115. *A Relation*, p. 16.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

118. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, pp. 252–59; J. Reitenfels, in *Chteniia*, CCXIV, part 2, 119; *A Relation*, p. 18. There are many accounts of Razin's execution. See, for instance, S. Konovalov, "Razin's Execution: Two Contemporary Documents," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, XII, 1965, 94–98; J. J. Martius, *Stephanus Razin Cossacus Perduellis*, Wittenberg, 1674, p. 30; *Katorga i Ssylka*, 1932, No. 3, pp. 128–36; and *Voprosy Istorii*, 1961, No. 8, pp. 208–12.

119. B. N. Tikhomirov, "Istochniki po istorii Razinshchiny," *Problemy Istochnikovedeniia*, 1933, No. 1, pp. 50–69; *Posol'stvo Kunraada fan-Klenka k tsariam Alekseiu Mikhailovichu i Fedoru Alekseevichu*, St. Petersburg, 1900, p. 210.

120. *AAE*, IV, 234; S. G. Svatikov, *Rossiia i Don (1549–1917)*, Belgrade, 1924, pp. 97–98.

121. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 184.

122. Popov, *Istoriia*, 127–28.

123. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 136, 183.
124. *Ibid.*, III, 184.
125. E. V. Chistiakova, "Astrakhan' v period vosstaniia Stepana Razina," *Istoriia SSSR*, 1957, No. 5, p. 199.
126. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 185.
127. *Ibid.*, III, 184.
128. *Ibid.*, III, 344–45; Z. I. Mikhailovicheva, *Stepan Razin*, Moscow, 1939, p. 48.
129. Firsov, *Razinovshchina*, p. 4.
130. Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, p. 198. The *veche* was the local town assembly in medieval Russia.
131. S. I. Tkhorzhevskii, *Sten'ka Razin*, Petrograd, 1923, p. 120.
132. *A Relation*, p. 13.
133. S. G. Tomsinskii, *Ocherki istorii feodal'no-krepostnoi Rossii*, Moscow, 1934, p. 183; N. K. Firsov, *Narodnye dvizheniia v Rossii do XIX veka*, Moscow, 1924, p. 46.
134. M. N. Smentsovskii, "St. Razin v nauke, literature i iskusstve," *Katorga i Ssylka*, 1932, No. 7, p. 193; Sokolov, *Russian Folklore*, p. 358.
135. M. A. Iakovlev, *Narodnoe pesnotvorchestvo ob atamane Stepane Razine*, Leningrad, 1924, pp. 34, 40; T. A. Martem'ianov, "Iz predanii o Sten'ke Razine," *Istoricheskii Vestnik*, CIX, 1907, 850–60; Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1965, p. 161.
136. Tomsinskii, *Krest'ianstvo i natsionaly*, p. xvi.
137. A. N. Lozanova, *Pesni i skazaniia o Razine i Pugacheve*, Moscow, 1935, p. 53.
138. Kostomarov, *Bunt Sten'ki Razina*, p. 356.
139. V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochineniia*, 5th edn., 55 vols., Moscow, 1958–1965, XXXVIII, 326.
140. *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot*, IV, 292–94, 323–26; Svatikov, *Rossiia i Don*, p. 124.
141. *Krest'ianskaia voina*, III, 376–77, 387.
142. *Krest'ianskie i natsional'nye dvizheniia nakanune obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi Imperii: Bulavinskoe vosstanie (1707–1708 gg.)*, Moscow, 1935, p. 130.

CHAPTER III: BULAVIN, 1707–1708

1. Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, London, 1951, p. 45.
2. John Perry, *The State of Russia Under the Present Czar*, London, 1716, p. 96.
3. V. O. Kliuchevsky, *Peter the Great*, New York, 1961, pp. 77, 81–84.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7; P. K. Shchebal'skii, *Pravlenie tsarevna Sofii*, Moscow, 1856, pp. 49–67; C. Bickford O'Brien, *Russia Under Two Tsars, 1682–1689*, Berkeley, Calif., 1952, pp. 22–39. The most recent study of the *streltsy* revolts is V. I. Buganov, *Moskovskie vosstaniia konsta XVII veka*, Moscow, 1969.

5. Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, 1949, p. 9.
6. Whitworth to Harley, March 14, 1705, *Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 127 vols., St. Petersburg, 1867–1916, XXXIX, 53. Cited hereafter as *SIRIO*.
7. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, pp. 42–43.
8. Svatikov, *Rossiia i Don*, p. 130.
9. N. B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 112–19; M. D. Rabinovich, "Strel'tsy v pervoi chetverti XVIII v.," *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, LVIII, 1956, 277.
10. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 47; Kliuchevsky, *Peter the Great*, pp. 157, 163, 178.
11. N. S. Chaev, *Bulavinskoe vosstanie (1707–1708 gg.)*, Moscow, 1934, p. 11.
12. Christopher Marsden, *Palmyra of the North: The First Days of St. Petersburg*, London, 1942, pp. 45–79.
13. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy*, p. 167.
14. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 22–23; Chaev, *Bulavinskoe vosstanie*, p. 13.
15. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, VIII, 98.
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31. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–79; *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, 11 vols. in 16, Moscow, 1887–1964, VI, 210.
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33. *Ibid.*
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45. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
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47. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
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CHAPTER IV: PUGACHEV, 1773-1774

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15. Coxe, *Travels,* II, 67.

16. *SIRIO,* XIX, 385; A. S. Pushkin, *Istoriia Pugachevskogo bunta,* 2 vols., St. Petersburg, 1834, I, 14.

17. *Voprosy Istorii,* 1966, No. 7, pp. 96–97.

18. Dubrovin, *Pugachev i ego soobshchniki,* I, 218–21. "Out of mud you can make a prince" is a Russian proverb which, says Trotsky, Stalin was fond of quoting. See Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Unarmed,* New York, 1959, p. 458.

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20. Rozner, *Kazachestvo v Krest'ianskoi voine,* p. 54; Dubrovin, *Pugachev i ego soobshchniki,* II, 16–18.

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27. *Pugachevshchina,* I, 33.

28. See Roger Portal, "Les Bachkirs et le gouvernement russe au XVIIIe siècle," *Revue des Études Slaves,* XXII, 1946, 82–104; F. Nefedov, "Dvizhenie sredi bashkir pered pugachevskim buntom," *Russkoe Bogatstvo,* 1880, No. 10, pp. 83–96; and N. A. Firsov, *Inorodcheskoe naselenie prezhnego Kazanskogo tsarstva,* Kazan, 1869, pp. 211ff.

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32. *Pugachevshchina,* I, 28.

33. Roger Portal, *L'Oural au XVIIIe siècle,* Paris, 1950, pp. 131–74; D. Kashintsev, *Istoriia metallurgii Urala,* Moscow, 1939, pp. 117–34. See also B. B. Kafengauz, *Istoriia khoziaistva Demidovykh v XVIII-XIX vv.,* Moscow, 1949. It is worth noting that some of the largest enterprises, such as the Avziano-Petrovsk works of Evdokim Demidov, were erected in Bashkir lands and that this figured prominently in Batyrsha's rising of 1755.

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35. *SIRIO,* CXV, 264; *Pugachevshchina,* II, 435; Dubrovin, *Pugachev i ego soobshchniki,* I, 356.

36. *Velikaia reforma,* 6 vols., Moscow, 1911, II, 37.

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39. A. V. Prussak, "Zavody rabotavshie na Pugacheva," *Istoricheskie Zapiski,* VIII, 1940, 178.

40. *Pugachevshchina,* I, 200.

41. François Auguste Thesby de Belcour, *Relation ou journal d'un officier françois au service de la Confédération de Pologne,* Amsterdam, 1776, p. 208.

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43. Dubrovin, *Pugachev i ego soobshchniki,* II, 195.

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101. *Pugachevshchina*, I, 36; III, 7.

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105. V. F. Zheludkov, "Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom E. I. Pugacheva i podgotovka gubernskoi reformy 1775 g.," *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta*, 1963, No. 8, p. 56.

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122. Castéra, *The Life of Catharine II*, II, 237.

123. *Bemerkungen über Esthland, Liefland, Russland*, p. 205. In the battle near Cherny Yar, Andrei Ovchinnikov was killed and Pugachev's two daughters were captured.

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The first section of the bibliography contains works of a general nature, while the succeeding sections list, in turn, studies of each particular revolt. For fuller listings see the items marked by an asterisk, which provide useful bibliographies. These should be supplemented by the bibliographical articles in *Istorik-Marksist*, 1933, No. 6, pp. 80–119; and *Voprosy Istorii*, 1957, No. 12, pp. 135–60; 1961, No. 5, pp. 24–47; and 1965, No. 3, pp. 127–40.

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Voron
Kiev
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Caspian Sea
Terek R.





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Pugachev (1773–1774), who led the last and greatest of the mass revolts.

Whirlwinds of death and destruction, the Russian revolts originated in the southern borderlands and swept across the open steppe into the Russian heartland, sending a thrill of terror through the landlords and officials in Moscow. Each time the violence spread with appalling swiftness as tens of thousands of Russian peasants and townsfolk, joined by native tribesmen from the Volga and Urals, rallied to the rebel standard, only to be crushed by government troops as they approached the centers of state power.

The four revolts were extremely complicated and differing episodes with features that cut across social and political lines. They combined Cossack insurrections with urban risings, peasant revolts, anticolonial resistance, religious and sectional conflict, and political intrigue. Yet they all had much in common. In each case it was a Cossack from the Don who took the lead. In each case the line between banditry and rebellion was exceedingly thin. In each case the rising was directed not against the czar but against the nobility and bureaucrats and the innovating state they administered. Each originated along the southern frontier. Each occurred during or after a major war, when the burden of taxes and recruitment was heaviest and social dislocation most severe. Each was marked by savage violence and immense human suffering. In each, moreover, religious and social myths played a key part in kindling the flames of rebellion. But the revolts, though elemental and destructive, were also diffuse. They lacked a coherent program and a coherent organization, and, faced with regular military formations, were suppressed with great bloodshed. The leaders in every case were victims of betrayal.

PAUL AVRICH is professor of Russian History at Queens College in New York. His recent works include *The Russian Anarchists* and *Kronstadt 1921*.